I certainly think Massimo has a point regarding the Computational Theory of Mind. He presents the issue a bit abstractly, though. A more intuitively forceful version of this argument is Searle's "Chinese Room" argument. Fortunately, a summary of that argument is presented in section 3.4 of the SEP article linked to on the right of the video. I encourage those unfamiliar with it to read that section (or better yet, look up Searle's original paper, which is a lot of fun). I want to point out that there is a deeper problem than this with the idea of immortality through replication. Massimo concedes that we might conceivably be able to create human beings (including their brains) from scratch. This would allow for the possibility (even assuming he and Searle are right about the necessarily biological basis of thinking) that I could be replicated cell-for-cell in precisely the physical state that I exist in now. Assuming a minimal version of physicalism, this would mean that the replica would be in the same mental state as I was in when replication occurred -- at least insofar as internal descriptions of the mental states are concerned. Of course, it will be

Decline in poverty has little to do with technology but with politics (e.g. China). Re. technology, except for Moore's law and its derivatives (bhtv, for example), there's been a noticeable slowdown. Planes are essentially the same they were 50 years ago (yes, new materials, fly-by-wire, a bit safer and a bit slower); same with cars; medicine has improved very slowly. Still no cure for any viruses (common cold?); cancer research is essentially stuck. 10,000 subtypes of a disease is usually bad news, not good news! Scientists will report great "progress" because that's how the game is played. No breakthrough molecule has been synthesized in the last 10 years. Transhumanists redefine the word "naive." (It helps not to know much about science to be an optimist.)

Pigliucci makes good points about physicalism. I am surprised Treder seems unable to grasp the behaviorist trap. It's a shame AI researchers have no training in continental philosophy. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty debunked strong AI much more effectively than Searle ever did. Incidentally, the first 40 years of AI research have been a miserable failure for two reasons: no consideration of probability theory; no consideration of phenomenology. Re, uploading one's mind, it's eerily similar to Intelligent Design: it roots its belief in an assumption, the reduction of cognition to a platform independent digital process, for which there is not the slightest bit of evidence. In fact, there is no scientific evidence that the reduction might not be driven all the way down to the quantum level, at which point the whole idea melts away.

Quoting ohreally: Decline in poverty has little to do with technology but with politics (e.g. China).

Re. technology, except for Moore's law and its derivatives (bhtv, for example), there's been a noticeable slowdown. Planes are essentially the same they were 50 years ago (yes, new materials, fly-by-wire, a bit safer and a bit slower); same with cars; medicine has improved very slowly. Still no cure for any viruses (common cold?); cancer research is essentially stuck. 10,000 subtypes of a disease is usually bad news, not good news! Scientists will report great "progress" because that's how the game is played. No breakthrough molecule has been synthesized in the last 10 years.

Transhumanists redefine the word "naive." (It helps not to know much about science to be an optimist.)

I disagree with your premise. "Tranes, Planes, and Automobiles" were nineteenth and twentieth century triumphs that, along with electromagnetic signal transmission, completely changed the world. The mechanical aspects of that revolution were refined by multiple orders of magnitude over that span, and we live with the benefits. Electronics and genetics (broadly speaking, information science) have only begun to show what they're good for, and, especially in the former case, have already had nearly as great an impact on people's lives as the above. I can't predict the

Note that I made an exception for computer technology. That's the ONLY technological revolution in the second half of the 20th c. Watson and Crick were the last giant bio breakthrough and that was 1952. Decoding the human genome was an IT breakthrough, not a biological one. If by exponential growth you mean the number of scientific papers, then yes you are right. But if you mean in the number of breakthroughs that is simply false. I wish I could say the latter half of the 20thc was somewhat of a slowdown. But in fact it's a dramatic slowdown, despite the huge increases in scientific manpower and resources. I make no prediction. Maybe the 21th c will be amazing. I don't know. All I am saying is that progress has been slowing down dramatically. The evidence is overwhelming. Maybe the low hanging fruits are gone. Maybe the things we're dealing with a more complex. But anyway a quick glance at the last 50 years of technology makes transhumanism a bit of a joke, no?

Quoting AemJeff: I disagree with your premise. "Tranes, Planes, and Automobiles" were nineteenth and twentieth century triumphs that, along with electromagnetic signal transmission, completely changed the world. The mechanical aspects of that revolution were refined by multiple orders of magnitude over that span, and we live with the benefits. Electronics and genetics (broadly speaking, information science) have only begun to show what they're good for, and, especially in the former case, have already had nearly as great an impact on people's lives as the above. I can't predict the future better than anyone else, but I don't see any reason to believe that we're not going to continue to see exponential growth in our scientific and technological mastery of the world. Certainly our ability to handle increasing complexity and to competently process higher degrees of abstraction seem to be growing unabated. As long as I continue to believe that's true, I'll continue to be an optimist.

Good post. Key word: exponential. The internet, I think, it on par with the invention of the wheel or discovery of fire as milestones in human evolution. The sheer volume of information available to people today, a characteristic of just the last ten - fifteen years, will radically transform human

It seems to me that the discussion of the ethics of "immortality" or "optional death" might have plumbed more interesting depths than it did. One question that lurks behind some of the discussion here, but which the diavloggers didn't really take up has to do with the nature of our responsibility to "future generations". Would it be selfish of us here and now, to take the extreme case, to determine that we will be the last generation of humans, just because we have the ability to live until the heat-death of the universe and because reproduction would lead to overpopulation?
Normally when we worry about our responsibility to future generations, there are actual future people to whom we ought to leave a decent environment etc. In these terms, we don't seem to be wronging actual person if we just decide not to reproduce and to use the resources that would otherwise belong to our children and grandchildren etc. for ourselves.
Perhaps it can't be regarded as selfish, then, but isn't it awfully arrogant? What's so special about this generation? I can't help but feel something along these lines, yet giving

That was... meaty. Definitely a pairing I would like to see again. I think my feelings about transhumanism line up pretty closely with Massimo's. I'd like to see transhumanism focus more on a realistic transition from where we are now to something better, rather than an ultimate ideal of/from the far future. Additionally, I think that advancement in science/technology must come with a net social benefit in order to be consider 'progress'. (Perhaps I am a technoprogressive?) I wonder if transhumanism doesn't also suffer from a bit of 'preaching to the choir'. I haven't seen it mainstream itself that well as a philosophy in the last 10 years, and now we're discussing it being irrelevant? Perhaps, in a future diavlog, these guys could talk about a broader communications stance/approach with respect to a trans/humanistic worldview?

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: It seems to me that the discussion of the ethics of "immortality" or "optional death" might have plumbed more interesting depths than it did.

Second that.

Quoting ohreally: Note that I made an exception for computer technology. That's the ONLY technological revolution in the second half of the 20th c. Watson and Crick were the last giant bio breakthrough and that was 1952. Decoding the human genome was an IT breakthrough, not a biological one.

If by exponential growth you mean the number of scientific papers, then yes you are right. But if you mean in the number of breakthroughs that is simply false. I wish I could say the latter half of the 20thc was somewhat of a slowdown. But in fact it's a dramatic slowdown, despite the huge increases in scientific manpower and resources. I make no prediction. Maybe the 21th c will be amazing. I don't know. All I am saying is that progress has been slowing down dramatically. The evidence is overwhelming. Maybe the low hanging fruits are gone. Maybe the things we're dealing with a more complex. But anyway a quick glance at the last 50 years of technology makes transhumanism a bit of a joke, no?

As an aside: among the scientific breakthroughs of the latter half of the twentieth century are quantum electrodynamics, quantum chromodynamics, the standard model of quantum mechanics, Bell's Theorem, the development

Quoting AemJeff: As an aside: among the scientific breakthroughs of the latter half of the twentieth century are quantum electrodynamics, quantum chromodynamics, the standard model of quantum mechanics, Bell's Theorem, the development of game theory (post von Neumann), chaos and complexity theory, etc... I don't know if those accomplishments rise to the level of those of Maxwell, Boltzmann, Einstein, Godel, Weyl, Heisenberg and von Neumann (e.g.), but I'd have a hard time making a definitive argument either way. I'm not sure what a valid yardstick would be (though a working theory of quantum gravity would be a nice validation of my point.)

More to the general point, I'd say that I think granting an "exception" for computer technology severely understates the case. We had a mechanical revolution, of which the slope of the developmental curve is admittedly beginning to seem to flatten. It obviously has had enormous benefits for human society. We're in the midst of an information revolution, the future projection of which is unclear. The current effects of it, however, seem to me to be at least comparable to those derived from that prior technological explosion, and there's no evidence (of which I'm aware) that there's any reason to believe

Quoting Ocean: does the question about rate of progress really matter? In my opinion the most interesting question is about how this progress, however fast or slow, is affecting our present and future.

That's really what ohreally's talking about: you pilot any solar-powered flying cars lately? Life in 2010 is virtually indistinguishable, technologically, from the 1950s, where the 1950s were radically, radically different--in terms of daily life--from the 1900s. The internet or home computing is perhaps the biggest, most obvious, practical difference, but how much of a change has it really effected? This site is bloggingheads.teevee...

Another great Science Saturday! There were many different aspects of the topic that merit an expanded discussion. I'll bring up just a few points. On the topic of extension of life span and the problem of boredom: although I agree that it is a legitimate aspect to be discussed, I don't think that there is much that can be said that would be truly meaningful. "Boredom" is dependent on many other conditions, including, and perhaps most prominently, one's emotional state. Speculating on the experience of boredom under conditions that are so radically different from our mortal experience would be just a pure exercise in one's imagination, or perhaps an exercise in one's limited imagination. For example, if I only have half an hour of free time, I may find myself bored because the activities that I can think of may take much longer time. When I'm in a good mood I may find many interesting things to do, while when I'm in a bad mood, nothing seems appealing. Boredom isn't only contingent on novelty, which is the main aspect that Massimo brought up. On the topic of extension of life span, when considered as a social and not

Quoting Ray: This site is bloggingheads.teevee...

Yes, but talking (or writing) to your TV a couple of decades ago would not have been very highly regarded by your friends and peers.

I’m not certain I see the complete relevance of the ‘technology curve’ here. Admittedly, was the technology curve actually declining then certain anticipated projections related to the trans-humanist project would become more questionable than they already are. But highlighting substantial increases in technology (and by implication science) to suggest that the curve has not flattened, or even continues to increase, does not seem to help the trans-humanist argument without a corresponding ‘faith’ in emergence as deterministic (and fundamental) consequence of complexity. While I agree with an earlier post that many earlier philosophers have addressed many of these issues, the fact remains that none of the trans-humanists have been able to convincingly address Searle’s basic challenge: how do you get semantics from syntactical operations? There are of course a number of more restrained trans-humanist goals within the “techno-progressive” agenda, but to the extent that they attempt to get beyond the ‘human,’ they all share the same characteristics. I think Jaron Lanier in a previous diavlog made a convincing point when he stated that something quite the opposite is actually happening: the trans-humanist agenda is in effect dumbing us down to meet the

Quoting Ray: That's really what ohreally's talking about: you pilot any solar-powered flying cars lately?

Life in 2010 is virtually indistinguishable, technologically, from the 1950s, where the 1950s were radically, radically different--in terms of daily life--from the 1900s.

The internet or home computing is perhaps the biggest, most obvious, practical difference, but how much of a change has it really effected?

This site is bloggingheads.teevee...

How do you check your bank balance? Where do you keep your cash? What if you need money at 3 am? How do you pay your bills? How do you store records? How would you go about investing in a security? How would one go about the task of accounting for an arbitrarily large set of accounts? What if you need to send a large and complex set of information to somebody and have it available to them five minutes from now? What if that information regards an immediately life-threatening medical condition? How do you find your way to someplace you've never been? What if you need to contact someone from the highway? This is a pretty ad hoc list, but there is no aspect of life too large or too small to

The difference between Google in 2000 and Google in 2010 alone is a cause for celebration.

Quoting claymisher: The difference between Google in 2000 and Google in 2010 alone is a cause for celebration.

Can you wiki that?

Quoting spandrel: I’m not certain I see the complete relevance of the ‘technology curve’ here. Admittedly, was the technology curve actually declining then certain anticipated projections related to the trans-humanist project would become more questionable than they already are. But highlighting substantial increases in technology (and by implication science) to suggest that the curve has not flattened, or even continues to increase, does not seem to help the trans-humanist argument without a corresponding ‘faith’ in emergence as deterministic (and fundamental) consequence of complexity. While I agree with an earlier post that many earlier philosophers have addressed many of these issues, the fact remains that none of the trans-humanists have been able to convincingly address Searle’s basic challenge: how do you get semantics from syntactical operations? There are of course a number of more restrained trans-humanist goals within the “techno-progressive” agenda, but to the extent that they attempt to get beyond the ‘human,’ they all share the same characteristics.

I think Jaron Lanier in a previous diavlog made a convincing point when he stated that something quite the opposite is actually happening: the trans-humanist agenda is in effect dumbing us down to meet the

I should add that I think Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment misses a simple point. The "human" in the experiment isn't required to understand Chinese in order for the "system" (which is composed of the operator, the script the operator follows, the equipment needed, and the protocol involved in passing symbols back and forth) to "understand" Chinese. It's, again, a problem of conflating levels and drawing an inappropriate conclusion.

Quoting AemJeff: This is a pretty ad hoc list, but there is no aspect of life too large or too small to have been unaffected by the information technology revolution. It permeates our lives at a fundamental level.

It's a petty list. Nothing on there makes all that much of a difference to daily life. I mean: you're seriously advancing slight conveniences as major technological advances? Looking at a map? Be serious. Even in the case of sending a bunch of medical data, you could just have had a couple of doctors talk on the phone. Let me put it this way: in the 1950s, if you got into a car crash and lost both your legs, you would go into surgery and either live or die. If you lived, you wouldn't get your legs back. What's different now? Or if you really want to stick to the petty stuff: this morning I heated up milk on my gas stove--gas stove??? Last night, the electric light bulb above my bathroom sink blew out--electric light bulb??? When I turn on my computer, it's ultimately powered by a coal fire. What are you even saying here?

Quoting Ocean: Yes, but talking (or writing) to your TV a couple of decades ago would not have been very highly regarded by your friends and peers.

I'm not talking to bloggingheads.tv now--or typing to it. I have no interaction with the guys who have been filmed. Sure; I'm communicating with you, but '50s housewives talked to each other on the phone while watching their soaps. It's really not that big of a deal.It's not a cure for cancer; it's not an alternative the the internal combustion engine; it's not a flight to Mars. It's just another way to sit on your ass on a Saturday.

I don't think how technology is advancing in the aggregate matters very much when gauging the probability of the transhumanists claims being true. How advanced our telecommunications networks are is almost totally independent of how cancer research has been progressing. What matters for the transhumanists claims is the more narrow question of how electronics, data processing, and biology have been advancing. Of the three, at least the first two have been advancing rapidly.

Quoting AemJeff: I thought the photosynthesis example was unconvincing, but I think for somewhat different reasons than spandrel gives. ...

I'm not exactly sure what this means in terms of simulating conscious systems, but I'm more willing than Pigliucci to take the result of the Turing test at face value.

The semantics issue I raised was tangential to the issue of simulation (my response was probably a bit to terse). The semantics issue relates to the “uploading of mind to a computer”, the Turing Test, and just about all other Artificial General Intelligence positions that the trans-humanists advance. There have been a number of AGI proponents (Dennett, Yudkowsky, et al.) who simply dismiss the syntactic/semantic path issue as either irrelevant or “solved.” But reviewing the “solutions” shows that they all fall within one or more of three general categories: intellectual prestidigitation (e.g., the “systems solution” such as the ‘Chinese Nation’ variant that claims that the nation itself would contain its own consciousness); a dismissal of the relevance of semantics; the axiom that semantics necessarily emerges from complexity. The issue of confusing simulation with duplication is a separate but related issue and goes to the point of the

Quoting Ray: It's a petty list. Nothing on there makes all that much of a difference to daily life. I mean: you're seriously advancing slight conveniences as major technological advances? Looking at a map? Be serious. Even in the case of sending a bunch of medical data, you could just have had a couple of doctors talk on the phone.

Let me put it this way: in the 1950s, if you got into a car crash and lost both your legs, you would go into surgery and either live or die. If you lived, you wouldn't get your legs back.

What's different now?

Or if you really want to stick to the petty stuff: this morning I heated up milk on my gas stove--gas stove???

Last night, the electric light bulb above my bathroom sink blew out--electric light bulb???

When I turn on my computer, it's ultimately powered by a coal fire. What are you even saying here?

What's trivial about the divorce of the means of exchange (currency) from physical tokens? It's a completely different mode of doing business. Money is an abstraction in a way that was never really true before, especially for middle class and poor people before

Quoting Ray: I'm not talking to bloggingheads.tv now--or typing to it. I have no interaction with the guys who have been filmed.

Sure; I'm communicating with you, but '50s housewives talked to each other on the phone while watching their soaps.

It's really not that big of a deal.It's not a cure for cancer; it's not an alternative the the internal combustion engine; it's not a flight to Mars. It's just another way to sit on your ass on a Saturday.

This is just another half empty half full scenario. If we had (and we have) alternatives to internal combustion engines, you would say we're still talking about engines. If we were talking about flights to Mars, you would say we're still talking about flying, like birds. And there's always some place where we can deposit our asses, as long as we have them... It's all about perspectives.

Quoting AemJeff: I should add that I think Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment misses a simple point. The "human" in the experiment isn't required to understand Chinese in order for the "system" (which is composed of the operator, the script the operator follows, the equipment needed, and the protocol involved in passing symbols back and forth) to "understand" Chinese. It's, again, a problem of conflating levels and drawing an inappropriate conclusion.

So you actually subscribe to the "systems solution?" Do you honestly believe that the "Room" in this case manifests consciousness, that it "understands" Chinese?

Quoting spandrel: So you actually subscribe to the "systems solution?" Do you honestly believe that the "Room" in this case manifests consciousness, that it "understands" Chinese?

I don't think that it's possible to achieve complete insight into that. That's why I approve of the Turing test - if something is indistinguishable from consciousness, by the best test I can administer, then I'm willing to treat it as consciousness.

Really enjoyed this and hope for this pairing again.

Hey, I got a wish! Been a long time coming, but it was well worth the wait. Only, not so long until the follow-up, please?

Quoting Ray: I'm not talking to bloggingheads.tv now--or typing to it. I have no interaction with the guys who have been filmed.

Sure; I'm communicating with you, but '50s housewives talked to each other on the phone while watching their soaps.

But suppose said housewives got bored talking to each other, or suppose one of them had an interest that none of the others in her calling circle shared? Or suppose one or some of them found being a housewife soul-crushingly dull or at least unfulfilling, and longed to have an outlet for expression, the ability to learn, or an opportunity to make money while still being around for her young children? I think that the Internet is not just a fancier phone system. In the regards suggested above, and probably more ways, it really does open up whole new worlds. Just to take the first sentence in the previous paragraph, and considering only this site, nay, considering only this site's forum, think of what we have here. I can interact with a couple hundred people who have interests that overlap mine (politics, technological, and scientific discussion), and even better, I can get the perspectives of people who live just

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: [...]

Good to see you back, BN. Couple of follow-up questions: On your "replication" and "property combinations" point, would you agree that the you of right now is different from the you of, say, ten years ago? And if you would, would you not also agree that someone who knew you back then would, upon meeting up with you now after some time out of touch, would feel as though he or she was not beginning a fresh acquaintance from scratch, but picking up from a point of knowing you, so to speak? On your thought experiment of asking me if I would mind being killed if I could be sure that there would at the same time be created a perfect replica of me (let's set aside "hundreds," since I find that thought fairly terrifying ), how much easier do you think it would be for me to say "yes" if I lived in a world where such replication had already been demonstrated, and was even fairly commonplace? I'd add the observation that the immediate reaction of "no!" seems driven by lower level processes, as it were -- the survival instinct seems built into all living things, or

Good post. I'd like to amplify just one of your points for now:

Quoting Ocean: On the topic of extension of life span and the problem of boredom: although I agree that it is a legitimate aspect to be discussed, I don't think that there is much that can be said that would be truly meaningful. "Boredom" is dependent on many other conditions, including, and perhaps most prominently, one's emotional state. Speculating on the experience of boredom under conditions that are so radically different from our mortal experience would be just a pure exercise in one's imagination, or perhaps an exercise in one's limited imagination. For example, if I only have half an hour of free time, I may find myself bored because the activities that I can think of may take much longer time. When I'm in a good mood I may find many interesting things to do, while when I'm in a bad mood, nothing seems appealing. Boredom isn't only contingent on novelty, which is the main aspect that Massimo brought up.

I quite agree. I'd add that if I had no sense of time pressure, there is no end of things I'd like to investigate and do. Maybe I couldn't fill

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: One question that lurks behind some of the discussion here, but which the diavloggers didn't really take up has to do with the nature of our responsibility to "future generations". [...]

I take your point here, but let me ask you to reconsider it if we make the additional technological assumption that humans need not be constrained to live on this one planet. Suppose we could engineer ourselves to be very long-lived, and some of us decided that it would therefore be possible, even desirable, to get on a spaceship and travel for however many years to other planets. How many of your objections would go away, in that light?

Quoting bjkeefe: Hey, I got a wish!

Been a long time coming, but it was well worth the wait. Only, not so long until the follow-up, please?

I'd add that while we're waiting, Massimo not only has a blog which I recommend, but he also appears to have caught the podcasting bug. This teaser certainly appeals to me, and I suspect to a few others.

That's something that came to my mind as well. It's safe to assume that radical life extension would come about as a small part of a greater technological advancement. The universe is a big place. If we have the means to make more of it inhabitable, I don't see the problem with a continually growing population. I'd also like to point out one of my favorite fictional settings that deals with a society that has achieved this level of technology: Iain M Bank's The Culture.

I am sorry, but as an old man who has always been terrified by the prospect of dying I find this discussion totally detached from reality. Juvenile. Silly. Pathetically ridiculous -- on both an emotional and a practical level. Health to the end of our natural lives? Of course. But beyond that, let us gracefully make room for our children and grandchildren: they not only make us happy but need an opportunity to have children of their own. Grow up.

Quoting BornAgainDemocrat: I am sorry, but as an old man who has always been terrified by the prospect of dying I find this discussion totally detached from reality. Juvenile. Silly. Pathetically ridiculous -- on both an emotional and a practical level. Health to the end of our natural lives? Of course. But beyond that, let us gracefully make room for our children and grandchildren: they not only make us happy but need an opportunity to have children of their own. Grow up.

Forget that! Seriously, if I could find a way to keep my consciousness and my identity intact I'd go to extraordinary lengths to accomplish that. Regardless of whether that's a graceful attitude, I certainly don't feel as if I owe anyone else the space I occupy.

Quoting AemJeff: Forget that! Seriously, if I could find a way to keep my consciousness and my identity intact I'd go to extraordinary lengths to accomplish that. Regardless of whether that's a graceful attitude, I certainly don't feel as if I owe anyone else the space I occupy.

Word. It's another manifestation of the cult of the natural. Death may be natural, but that doesn't mean it is intrinsically good. Human being impose our will on the natural world, it's what we do.

Quoting AemJeff: I don't think that it's possible to achieve complete insight into that. That's why I approve of the Turing test - if something is indistinguishable from consciousness, by the best test I can administer, then I'm willing to treat it as consciousness.

Fair enough. You appear to fall squarely within the ‘functionalist’ camp which would be close to the position that Dennett takes. This is precisely why he denies (in reference to the ‘zombie’ thought experiment) that a ‘zombie’ could actually exist in the sense argued; it would be conscious. Personally, I see no theoretical reason for this denial, but it is certainly an arguable position. But on the Turing Test, I simply do not see how passing the test gets anywhere close to demonstrating a phenomena “indistinguishable from consciousness.” In fact, I’d be a bit surprised if the test isn’t met in the foreseeable future.

cancer research is essentially stuck You might want to talk to a cancer researcher and not listen to those like John Horgan who dismiss advances without taking the time to learn about them. Decoding the human genome was an IT breakthrough, not a biological one.
Then wouldn't you also say that the discovery of DNA was an X ray crystallography breakthrough, not a biological one?

Quoting spandrel: Fair enough. You appear to fall squarely within the ‘functionalist’ camp which would be close to the position that Dennett takes. This is precisely why he denies (in reference to the ‘zombie’ thought experiment) that a ‘zombie’ could actually exist in the sense argued; it would be conscious. Personally, I see no theoretical reason for this denial, but it is certainly an arguable position. But on the Turning Test, I simply do not see how passing the test gets anywhere close to demonstrating a phenomena “indistinguishable from consciousness.” In fact, I’d be a bit surprised if the test isn’t met in the foreseeable future.

I think the Turing test is a pretty subtle instrument. I think of the "uncanny valley" that characterizes the failure of human simulacra to "pass" as human. I think our fine-grained ability to make such distinctions is extremely sensitive; though, admittedly this is an example of an analogy to the actual problem we're discussing, not a direct comparison. What I think may be a basic issue for the Turing test is that "consciousness" and "human consciousness" aren't coextensive ideas, and there might be all sorts of things for which such a test isn't suitable. If I understand the "zombie" issue, the basis

Quoting BornAgainDemocrat: I am sorry, but as an old man who has always been terrified by the prospect of dying I find this discussion totally detached from reality. Juvenile. Silly. Pathetically ridiculous -- on both an emotional and a practical level. Health to the end of our natural lives? Of course. But beyond that, let us gracefully make room for our children and grandchildren: they not only make us happy but need an opportunity to have children of their own. Grow up.

http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/mlb...ory?id=4524957

I thought about one day being able to upload myself to some other vessel to escape death. Because losing me from the world would be such a loss right guys !!!!
... Anyway, it seems this would only make a copy of you though right? The original, would still die, bound in the biological shell. Upload yourself to a computer, copy the mind exactly, or to some other container and it still does not preserve the source.
There may be an identical copy of the source, the same in all the important ways, but it still does nothing to save the original, we will still die. That our copy lives on is nice and all, but does not have the same impact as if we did. Sad really, too bad I am not religious, at least they have an out psychologically, even if untrue. But maybe there is an out depending on what the nature of the self is. If all it is is a set of experiences and intuitions or whatever makes us consciously aware, then fine. Maybe a consciousness can be mirrored a thousand times in the universe, and having one snuffed out would be

massimo's words of wisdom are refreshing.

Quoting ginger baker: massimo's words of wisdom are refreshing.

Which ones?

Quoting AemJeff: .... What I think may be a basic issue for the Turing test is that "consciousness" and "human consciousness" aren't coextensive ideas, and there might be all sorts of things for which such a test isn't suitable.

If I understand the "zombie" issue, the basis for the denial is simply that there's no yardstick to make such a distinction. And without other insight, Occam's razor seems to pretty strongly imply that any inference that a particular entity is a "zombie" won't be the best interpretation of the available evidence.

But again, I think the distinction you are making between “consciousness” and “human consciousness” goes directly to Lanier’s point, especially as relates to the Turing test as originally proposed. On the “zombie” issue, you are correct that there are those who would take that stance, but not Dennett I believe, and certainly not the strict “functionalists.” Their position is not one derived from agnosticism, but from the positive assertion of functional equivalence. Keep in mind that it is not simply the case that one stumbles on to what turns out to be a “zombie” and makes a determination, based on its observed behavior that it has “consciousness.” Of course, based on the

Quoting spandrel: But again, I think the distinction you are making between “consciousness” and “human consciousness” goes directly to Lanier’s point, especially as relates to the Turing test as originally proposed. On the “zombie” issue, you are correct that there are those who would take that stance, but not Dennett I believe, and certainly not the strict “functionalists.” Their position is not one derived from agnosticism, but from the positive assertion of functional equivalence. Keep in mind that it is not simply the case that one stumbles on to what turns out to be a “zombie” and makes a determination, based on its observed behavior that it has “consciousness.” Of course, based on the characteristics given (perfect simulation of all human attributes), that conclusion would be quite reasonable from just about any viewpoint. The problem comes in when one knows a prior that the “zombie” is not organic, is not a human, and reaches the same conclusion based purely on its function. I believe the Occam’s Razor position becomes a bit less persuasive in this case but not entirely. Not entirely because such a conclusion will always be colored by ones knowledge of the current state of technology. Were

Quoting consider: cancer research is essentially stuck

You might want to talk to a cancer researcher and not listen to those like John Horgan who dismiss advances without taking the time to learn about them.

Decoding the human genome was an IT breakthrough, not a biological one.
Then wouldn't you also say that the discovery of DNA was an X ray crystallography breakthrough, not a biological one?

Beat me to it, consider. I would also add that MOST great breakthroughs happen 'in' fields other than the ones they affect. For example, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is widely regarded as the founding document of modern economics, yet when it was written, it was a breakthrough "in" the field of philosophy. In other words, this question of discipline is a bit silly.

Quoting bjkeefe: Good to see you back, BN. Couple of follow-up questions:

On your "replication" and "property combinations" point, would you agree that the you of right now is different from the you of, say, ten years ago? And if you would, would you not also agree that someone who knew you back then would, upon meeting up with you now after some time out of touch, would feel as though he or she was not beginning a fresh acquaintance from scratch, but picking up from a point of knowing you, so to speak?

Hi Brendan,
The answer to your question depends on what you mean by 'different'. I have changed in 10 years, so I have different properties -- I am qualitatively different from what I was like 10 years ago. But I am emphatically NOT a different person now, despite those changes. Persons, like other concrete particulars, persist through change. The person met now and the person met 10 years ago are qualitatively different but numerically the same. If I want to survive until I'm ten years older than I am now, I don't hope to remain qualitatively the same. I hope to be identical with a person living 10 years from now, even though that person will be qualitatively different. Of course, other people

Quoting spandrel: If one philosophically accepts that a “zombie” can exist, then one has taken the stance that consciousness is, as currently understood, essentially a spandrel.

There is a huge metaphysical obstacle to ascribing contingency to human consciousness (as a spandrel would imply). The statement, "consciousness is contingent" is neither true nor false. It's nonsensical, since the sentence itself relies on the necessity of consciousness for its very meaning. All the talk about the evolutionary status of qualia is empty. This is not just metaphysical nitpicking. It makes Dennett's entire enterprise DOA. It's not a property of consciousness of not being explainable: it's constitutive of it. I recommend Ruben's "Explaining Explanation" for those who don't see why Dennett's project is epistemologically unsound.

Quoting bjkeefe: I take your point here, but let me ask you to reconsider it if we make the additional technological assumption that humans need not be constrained to live on this one planet. Suppose we could engineer ourselves to be very long-lived, and some of us decided that it would therefore be possible, even desirable, to get on a spaceship and travel for however many years to other planets. How many of your objections would go away, in that light?

I make no claim that the issue arises of necessity in all possible worlds. It isn't really a matter of planets and space -- or not only that -- it's a matter of resources. But we can imagine a future in which energy cold fusion works and energy costs a millionth of a penny per gigawatt hour and is entirely non-polluting etc. But simply imagining the question away doesn't dispense with the philosophical issue involved: IF you had to choose between immortality for the current generation and devoting the same resources to future generations, would there be anything wrong with choosing immortality for the current generation, and if so, how can

Quoting AemJeff: ELIZA is certainly, in a limited sense, a kind of zombie; but there's no chance that it would pass the Turing test.

Agreed. [Edit: 'agreed' to the second clause, not the first that ELIZA is a 'kind of zombie' in the sense under discussion].

Quoting AemJeff: If something is good enough to pass the Turing test, I'm not sure the argument that it was just "clever programming" would seem particularly strong to me.

But why not? Here is Turing's own criteria (we can just ignore the time-frames as they are not important): I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 10e9, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. … I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted. I have seen systems that can trip-up many novices, at least initially. And I have no reason to believe they will not get a great deal better without any emergent properties. But yes, our razors may

Quoting PreppyMcPrepperson: Beat me to it, consider. I would also add that MOST great breakthroughs happen 'in' fields other than the ones they affect. For example, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations is widely regarded as the founding document of modern economics, yet when it was written, it was a breakthrough "in" the field of philosophy. In other words, this question of discipline is a bit silly.

I understand, and agree, with your general point. But ohreally does have a point in the context he was arguing. The genome sequencing breakthrough of 2000/2001 was in fact simply the result of C. Venter's shotgun sequencing algorithms and not a significant advance in our understanding of the genome, or genetics, per se. That it led to much better research in the mechanisms of gene expression, transcription, etc., is of course also true. But there were no great breakthroughs here in terms of our scientific understanding.

Quoting ohreally: There is a huge metaphysical obstacle to ascribing contingency to human consciousness (as a spandrel would imply). The statement, "consciousness is contingent" is neither true nor false. It's nonsensical, since the sentence itself relies on the necessity of consciousness for its very meaning. All the talk about the evolutionary status of qualia is empty.

This is not just metaphysical nitpicking. It makes Dennett's entire enterprise DOA. It's not a property of consciousness of not being explainable: it's constitutive of it. I recommend Ruben's "Explaining Explanation" for those who don't see why Dennett's project is epistemologically unsound.

Well, this will certainly put a kink in the trans-humanist's programme. We'll need a new and better thought experiment.

Quoting spandrel: I understand, and agree, with your general point. But ohreally does have a point in the context he was arguing. The genome sequencing breakthrough of 2000/2001 was in fact simply the result of C. Venter's shotgun sequencing algorithms and not a significant advance in our understanding of the genome, or genetics, per se. That it led to much better research in the mechanisms of gene expression, transcription, etc., is of course also true. But there were no great breakthroughs here in terms of our scientific understanding.

Why is better research into--and therefore more knowledge/understanding--of gene expression, and particularly interactions between genes and disease, not an expansion of scientific understanding?

Quoting spandrel: Agreed.

But why not? Here is Turing's own criteria (we can just ignore the time-frames as they are not important):

I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 10e9, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. … I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.

I have seen systems that can trip-up many novices, at least initially. And I have no reason to believe they will not get a great deal better without any emergent properties.

But yes, our razors may just differ in sharpness, and mine may turn out to be the blunt one after all.

You're certainly right to say that the original test is probably too easily beaten to be very useful. Turing was obviously speculating when he specified the parameters. (Interestingly his

Quoting PreppyMcPrepperson: Why is better research into--and therefore more knowledge/understanding--of gene expression, and particularly interactions between genes and disease, not an expansion of scientific understanding?

It absolutely was an expansion, and an important one. I was just responding to what I thought was the context of ohreally when he spoke of 'revolutions' and 'breakthroughs' in the paragraph in which the quote appeared. Venter's shotgun sequencing technique was basically a political triumph over his adversaries when he started Celera Genomics. He had proposed using the technique for the gov't-led Human Genome Project but was shut down. Before he came along, researchers were writing dissertations on the completion of a single gene sequence. Venter simply had a way to speed up the process significantly. But sequencing had been taking place for years and at the end of the drosophila and human genome sequencing projects (followed by many, many more model organisms), there aren't really any breakthroughs that can be directly attributable to the sequencing of the complete genome. But, yes, it was a signficant advance in speeding up our understanding of gene interactions, etc.

The paragraph as I read it says "decoding genome WAS a breakthrough, but not in biology," And I'm saying, given that all its implications have been in bio, the fact that the processes involved were computational is not so important. What you are saying (that it was a big deal, but not a breakthrough) seems to be a third position that is neither mine nor ohreally's.

Quoting PreppyMcPrepperson: The paragraph as I read it says "decoding genome WAS a breakthrough, but not in biology," And I'm saying, given that all its implications have been in bio, the fact that the processes involved were computational is not so important. What you are saying (that it was a big deal, but not a breakthrough) seems to be a third position that is neither mine nor ohreally's.

Actually, I think ohreally is saying that (but he can speak for himself). But it really doesn't matter. It is simply a fact that if we are going to use the word 'breakthrough', none occurred in biology due to the sequencing of the human genome: (1) no conceptual barriers were broken-through with this technique, and (2) the final accomplishment of sequencing the whole genome led to no breakthroughs in our understanding of the genome. It simply provided the raw material for a continuing, incremental advance, but at a much faster pace. And even beyond that, more opportunities are now available in comparitive genomics, etc., but again, no breakthroughs have been made. I don't think you will find any serious scientist that would argue otherwise. A few quotes to help you along: "And what is significant in

Quoting spandrel: Actually, I think ohreally is saying that (but he can speak for himself). But it really doesn't matter. It is simply a fact that if we are going to use the word 'breakthrough', none occurred in biology due to the sequencing of the human genome: (1) no conceptual barriers were broken-through with this technique, and (2) the final accomplishment of sequencing the whole genome led to no breakthroughs in our understanding of the genome. It simply provided the raw material for a continuing, incremental advance, but at a much faster pace. And even beyond that, more opportunities are now available in comparitive genomics, etc., but again, no breakthroughs have been made. I don't think you will find any serious scientist that would argue otherwise. A few quotes to help you along:

"And what is significant in the human genome sequence? The major irony of the sequencing of the human genome is that the result turns out not to provide the answer to the chief question that motivated the project. Now that we have the complete sequence of the human genome we do not, alas, know anything more than we did before about what it is to

Quoting PreppyMcPrepperson: The paragraph as I read it says "decoding genome WAS a breakthrough, but not in biology," And I'm saying, given that all its implications have been in bio, the fact that the processes involved were computational is not so important. What you are saying (that it was a big deal, but not a breakthrough) seems to be a third position that is neither mine nor ohreally's.

Right, I think the human genome project is like the Large Hadron Collider (assuming the latter ever works...) or Galileo's telescope: an engineering achievement of considerable importance but not from within the field itself. A great enabler but not a conceptual game changer. Crick & Watson on the other hand changed the way we think.

Quoting ohreally: Right, I think the human genome project is like the Large Hadron Collider (assuming the latter ever works...) or Galileo's telescope: an engineering achievement of considerable importance but not from within the field itself. A great enabler but not a conceptual game changer. Crick & Watson on the other hand changed the way we think.

I think my point of agreement with you was on what you are terming "conceptual game changer." Where I guess I disagree to some extent (with both you and Preppy) is on the neat separation of what you are terming an "IT" breakthrough, and Preppy a "computational" one (outside of the field of biology). In fact, the sequencing techniques used to sequence the multiple genomes at Celera were developed by computational biologists, not IT staff, and are highly dependent on an understanding of the structure of DNA. The separation implied in this thread doesn't really exist to the extent suggested. But a minor point and I understand the conceptual separation you are making although I don't see the shotgun process as a 'breakthrough' in any fundamental sense.

Quoting spandrel: I think my point of agreement with you was on what you are terming "conceptual game changer." Where I guess I disagree to some extent (with both you and Preppy) is on the neat separation of what you are terming an "IT" breakthrough, and Preppy a "computational" one (outside of the field of biology). In fact, the sequencing techniques used to sequence the multiple genomes at Celera were developed by computational biologists, not IT staff, and are highly dependent on an understanding of the structure of DNA. The separation implied in this thread doesn't really exist to the extent suggested. But a minor point and I understand the conceptual separation you are making although I don't see the shotgun process as a 'breakthrough' in any fundamental sense.

Right, and I'm agreeing with Spandrel that there isn't such a neat separation as you suggest, but positing that there is still something of a breakthrough, regardless of which field it occurred in. So that, it is as I said before--all three of us are saying slightly different things. Ta-ta.

But what if your main concern is to experience something -- say a month-long vacation in Europe starting next week. Would you not care if I kill you so long as your replica goes to Europe? What if I don't kill you but just keep you in the basement until your replica has enjoyed the whole itinerary? Would that be just as good for you as if you had been able to go? If not, how could it possibly be better if I killed you rather than keeping you in the basement? The difference isn't that YOU would experience the vacation if I killed you just before activating the replica. The difference is just that if I kill you first, you can more easily continue under the illusion that you survive as the replica.

I'm looking forward to watching this dialog, but for now I'm just reading some of the comments. I think the above provides some good intuitions into the problems with replicas (the problems that transhumanists tend to ignore). Another approach I find useful in grappling with the question is to consider the impossibility of simultaneous selves: If "you" were really

The talk of last generations seems foolish to me. It would take centuries for things to get to crowded on earth, and if we were truly able to live that long, the universe is a big place, we could get on ships and colonize other worlds well within the span of a single lifetime if we could live a thousand years, even at sub light speeds.
How long will it take to overpopulate the galaxy? if the answer is millions of years, then my response is in the category of why should we care?
On the virtues of non immortality, check out this episode of Babylon 5 at around the 7:15 mark into the episode (suffer through the commercial delay, man up and take it). Pay close attention to the interaction between Ivanova and Lorien (a first one, a VERY old being) and his thoughts on the gifts of shorter lives.
http://www.thewb.com/shows/babylon-5...ire/9672a2a9a1
I say this with no exaggeration. Babylon 5 was the single greatest tv series in the history of human civilization. This is not a debatable point, if you disagree, you are wrong. So for those too lazy to watch the section I mentioned, GET OVER IT it is required

I picked up Lehrer's book called how we decide, and have been going through it recently, and there are some examples that show that programs can be written that do not rely on brute forcing all possibilities.
He was talking about the interactions between emotion, reason, dopamine and so called "prediction neurons" and how these mechanisms in the brain conspire, with heavy use of our emotional capacities, to get us to learn and adapt. We have a model of how something works, and through a process of trial and error we continuously refine our predictions, all the while dopamine is sent out in varying degrees to modulate our experience and feelings when something fits a model, and when it does not. When it does not, it sends a jolt through the system and the prediction neurons get to work again helping us learn the patterns.. when things go well. ... this is explained much better in short here: http://fora.tv/2010/01/05/Jonah_Lehr...ide#chapter_07
Turns out we show signs of extra worry before we consciously know something is awry (like when choosing a card among different sets with the highest value {where the left stack

How would prolonging life without improving the quality of life be humanistic, transhumanistic, or indeed even humane? Human.... the word is cognate with humus (earth), lest we forget. Massimo raises some doubts near the end about the biological obstacles to extending life beyond a certain age, but he shares the basic premise of "transhumanism", namely that life, mere life, is a good in itself. Is it? Why is it better to prolong life for more and more people? The same logic of abstract quantity dominates our thinking on every subject: More material goods for more and more people who shall live longer and longer, even if they are bored out of their minds = progress. I found this whole diavlog dreary and repugnant, an example of a kind of boyish technophilia and morbid fear of death that European and American civilisation have succeeded in imposing on the world.

Quoting Florian: How would prolonging life without improving the quality of life be humanistic, transhumanistic, or indeed even humane? Human.... the word is cognate with humus (earth), lest we forget.

Massimo raises some doubts near the end about the biological obstacles to extending life beyond a certain age, but he shares the basic premise of "transhumanism", namely that life, mere life, is a good in itself. Is it? Why is it better to prolong life for more and more people? The same logic of abstract quantity dominates our thinking on every subject: More material goods for more and more people who shall live longer and longer, even if they are bored out of their minds = progress.

I found this whole diavlog dreary and repugnant, an example of a kind of boyish technophilia and morbid fear of death that European and American civilisation have succeeded in imposing on the world.

I'm glad you said that. I'll let my replica watch it.

Quoting Florian: Why is it better to prolong life for more and more people?

And what will this mean for our warming planet? It couldn't be at all good.

Quoting Spandrel quoting Turing

I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 10e9, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. … I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.

This is, I'm sure, a naive observation....but doesn't the inability of the interrogator to spot the computer say more about the interrogator and the programmer than it does the actual ability of the computer?

Quoting badhatharry: Quoting Spandrel quoting Turing

This is, I'm sure, a naive observation....but doesn't the inability of the interrogator to spot the computer say more about the interrogator and the programmer than it does the actual ability of the computer?

Naive?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_turing

Quoting Ocean: It's all about perspectives.

Of course, it's about perspectives, but the only way to maintain yours is by ignoring the main course of scientific and technological progress, by pretending that science began ca. 1970. And I'm not alone in my perspective. North Carolina put the Wright Brothers on its State quarter. Anybody do that for messageboards yet?

Quoting AemJeff: What's trivial about the divorce of the means of exchange (currency) from physical tokens?

It's not that it's trivial. It's that it's old--as Old as the Knights Templar, at least.

Quoting AemJeff: It's a completely different mode of doing business. Money is an abstraction in a way that was never really true before

Didn't Jesus Christ make this argument?

Quoting AemJeff: Information and money are now treated as almost complete abstractions in the modern world, infinitely fungible resources. Everything from doing crossword puzzles to setting up global banking systems is different as a result.

No; they're not. They're not at all. You know that Africa has virtually no Internet, right?

Quoting badhatharry: Quoting Spandrel quoting Turing

This is, I'm sure, a naive observation....but doesn't the inability of the interrogator to spot the computer say more about the interrogator and the programmer than it does the actual ability of the computer?

At the significant risk of betraying an enlightened-ironist stance, I'd have to agree.

Quoting spandrel: I think my point of agreement with you was on what you are terming "conceptual game changer." Where I guess I disagree to some extent (with both you and Preppy) is on the neat separation of what you are terming an "IT" breakthrough.

I didn't imply a neat separation and probably shouldn't have used the phrase IT.

Quoting spandrel: At the significant risk of betraying an enlightened-ironist stance, I'd have to agree.

So I have thought about this since I posted and having seen your response, I am tempted to think that you are mocking my observation....but maybe not. I guess it is just that I really don't understand the allure of thinking that computers can or ever will be as smart as people are. In the first place (as I think my observation alludes to) they are nothing but human creations and their abilities reflect human abilities. Second, the human brain is so complex it will never be able to be duplicated. Pray tell....what is an enlightened-ironist stance?

Quoting AemJeff: Naive?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_turing

Not Turing, silly! me!

I know politicians who pass the reverse Turing test. Hide them behind a screen and no one can tell whether they're humans or robots.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: [...]

I'm sorry, but I just don't follow these at all:

I am qualitatively different from what I was like 10 years ago. But I am emphatically NOT a different person now, despite those changes.

I don't hope to remain qualitatively the same. I hope to be identical with a person living 10 years from now, even though that person will be qualitatively different.

The person met now and the person met 10 years ago are qualitatively different but numerically the same.

However, as you say prior to that ...

The answer to your question depends on what you mean by 'different'.

... so maybe it's just a limitation of the language thing -- you and I assign different meanings to certain words in certain contexts. To me, something cannot be "numerically the same," even metaphorically, and different. I would use that metaphor to mean the strictest sense of being the same. I don't want to make too much of your thought experiment, since it seems unlikely in the extreme to me that we will have that technology anytime soon, but just for the record ...

... why shouldn't the creator of your replica create a person who didn't even seem to remember very much of your past

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: I make no claim that the issue arises of necessity in all possible worlds. It isn't really a matter of planets and space -- or not only that -- it's a matter of resources.

I don't get what you mean here. The whole point of assuming we have some practical form of space travel is that "[other] planets and [more] space" addresses the problem of resource shortages that very long-lived humans might cause.

But we can imagine a future in which energy cold fusion works and energy costs a millionth of a penny per gigawatt hour and is entirely non-polluting etc. But simply imagining the question away doesn't dispense with the philosophical issue involved: IF you had to choose between immortality for the current generation and devoting the same resources to future generations, would there be anything wrong with choosing immortality for the current generation, and if so, how can one account for its wrongness (given that no actual people were wronged)?

First, we should distinguish between immortality and what I am thinking of: significantly increased, yet still finite, lifespans. I'm not sure why this distinction matters to me, but it does. But assuming living for

Quoting Florian: I found this whole diavlog dreary and repugnant, an example of a kind of boyish technophilia and morbid fear of death that European and American civilisation have succeeded in imposing on the world.

I'm sorry you did not like this diavlog, but I think you should at least appreciate the idea that some people are starting to think through the ramifications of what seems like a plausible technological projection. I'm also not sure why you didn't get that Massimo, at least, was raising objections, or at least expressing skepticism, about the assumption that vastly longer human lifespans would be an inherently good thing. As a minor point, your view that either "technophilia" or "morbid fear of death" are unique to European and American civilization is so ... well, let's just say I refuse to believe you're serious in saying that.

Quoting badhatharry: Pray tell....what is an enlightened-ironist stance?

The view that, contrary to what your mama taught you, a few wrinkles in your shirt is not the end of the world.

Quoting badhatharry: Not Turing, silly! me!

There are two people to whom the discipline of computer science owes its existence more than any others. They are John von Neumann and Alan Turing. Turing's responsibility the Allies' win in WWII may, arguably, be greater than that of any other individual (see). His direct contributions include the invention of the Turing Machine, an abstraction that provided the model for almost all digital computing machinery in existence. He wrote the first chess program, btw, and since there was at the time no extant machinery powerful enough to run it, he played a game against a colleague, Alick Glennie, in which Turing simulated the runiing of that program. He lost the match. It's far too ironic to let a charge of "naivetee" stand against a man whose inportance to the field is simply unparalleled.

Quoting AemJeff: It's far too ironic to let a charge of "naivetee" stand against a man whose inportance to the field is simply unparalleled.

In badhat's defense, I don't think she was calling Turing naive. I think she was issuing a prefatory disclaimer about her own rhetorical question.

... to sell a link:

Quoting JonIrenicus: I say this with no exaggeration. Babylon 5 was the single greatest tv series in the history of human civilization. This is not a debatable point, if you disagree, you are wrong. So for those too lazy to watch the section I mentioned, GET OVER IT it is required viewing for all human beings who wish to be more than barbarians.

I didn't say having a copy of me would be good. I was thinking in terms of the one copy of me replacing me, and wondering whether I would care about that.

I think the claim of some T-humanists is that the copy would BE you; i.e., you would just switch into another body or a virtual world with no significant break in your consciousness. That is the claim I think BNoggin is refuting (or being very skeptical of).

Quoting Wonderment: I think the claim of some T-humanists is that the copy would BE you; i.e., you would just switch into another body or a virtual world with no significant break in your consciousness. That is the claim I think BNoggin is refuting (or being very skeptical of).

That much I think I got. But if we stipulate a sufficiently advanced technology -- one that makes it possible to create an exact copy of me at some specified moment -- and that copy is created at the same time as I am killed, I don't see any difference, and as I said to BN, if there were some incentive for me to agree to this copy and delete operation, as it were, I don't think I'd have a problem overcoming the biological instinct of self-preservation and going through with it. Of course, this "sufficiently advanced technology" is something that I expect lies quite a bit farther down the road than perhaps some transhumanists do, so this branch of the discussion is not really of that much interest to me. What I did find intriguing was Massimo's notion that we cannot be humans if our minds (to include consciousness, memories, whatever you

But if we stipulate a sufficiently advanced technology -- one that makes it possible to create an exact copy of me at some specified moment -- and that copy is created at the same time as I am killed, I don't see any difference, and as I said to BN, if there were some incentive for me to agree to this copy and delete operation, as it were, I don't think I'd have a problem overcoming the biological instinct of self-preservation and going through with it.

What did you think of BN's exploration of the case where you don't die and are just left in a dungeon while the other "you" goes on to have a happy life. You'd agree that the other Brendan is distinct from the guy (you) in the dungeon, right? By this logic, there's really nothing beneficial in the upload for "you" (dungeon dude) .

Quoting Wonderment: What did you think of BN's exploration of the case where you don't die and are just left in a dungeon while the other "you" goes on to have a happy life. You'd agree that the other Brendan is distinct from the guy (you) in the dungeon, right?

By this logic, there's really nothing beneficial in the upload for "you" (dungeon dude) .

Assuming that the me in the dungeon wasn't actually being gruesomely tormented, and again, that the copy is exact, I don't think I'd have a problem doing that, either. One benefit for the dungeon me could be, as I suggested before, in a scenario where the original me had been physically and irreparably damaged. I assumed that the original me would be killed after the copy had been created, but if someone said, "Look, you're paralyzed from the neck down and we can't fix that. But we can make an exact copy of you (without the broken spine), and what we ask in return is that we get to keep the original you here to run tests on, so that maybe someday, we can fix this kind of injury," I think I'd be pretty happy to

Quoting bjkeefe: The view that, contrary to what your mama taught you, a few wrinkles in your shirt is not the end of the world.

I was going to give the Rorty formulation, but it falls well short of this one.

Quoting badhatharry: So I have thought about this since I posted and having seen your response, I am tempted to think that you are mocking my observation....but maybe not.

Not at all. You were correct at detecting a slight mocking tone, but that was self-directed. I was generally agreeing with you.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'd add that while we're waiting, Massimo not only has a blog which I recommend, but he also appears to have caught the podcasting bug. This teaser certainly appeals to me, and I suspect to a few others.

The most recently posted podcast (the one teased above is not yet available) is "RS04: The Great Atheist Debate Over the Limits of Science." The blurb is as follows:

"Accommodationist" is a word that began to appear in recent months during public debates over science and religion. The derogatory term has been applied to atheists and rationalists like Eugenie Scott, at the National Center for Science Education, and Chris Mooney, science writer at Discover Magazine, who maintain that science and faith are not necessarily incompatible. Although the debate is frequently framed as a practical one, about what the tactics of the secular movement should be, it is also a philosophical one, hinging on the question of the epistemic limits of science. In this episode, we examine the arguments being made by and against the so-called "accommodationists," and ask: Can science disprove religious and supernatural claims?

It may be of interest to note that Massimo, who describes himself as an

I'm only halfway through the podcast thus far, but I'm amazed at how many of Pigliucci's points Treder just allows to slide by. Concurring that technology has only benefited 1/4-1/3 of the population is amazing. But I'd also like to point out that it's dangerously fallacious to assume that if you cut down the world's population to 1/2 or 1/3 of what it currently is, that we would still enjoy the same levels of per capita GDP and GDP growth, but would simply have less environmental strain. The fallacy becomes clear when we consider whether our lifestyle could be sustained with a population of only a thousand or a million people: Probably not. It's hard to envision what the costs of having a decimated population would be on our rate of progress, but that doesn't excuse our pretending that they don't exist. Furthermore, Treder should have asked about the following: a) Why possible issues of overpopulation call for not extending lifespans rather than controlling reproduction. b) Given that Pigliucci implies that we're already past the optimal population size, why he apparently doesn't support current efforts to keep develop life-extending medicines or

Quoting badhatharry: I guess it is just that I really don't understand the allure of thinking that computers can or ever will be as smart as people are.

That's perfectly reasonable, but you should not close your mind to the reality that many other people do find this fascinating to contemplate. It should also be said that some of them do this precisely because they are pessimistic that it will happen.

In the first place (as I think my observation alludes to) they are nothing but human creations and their abilities reflect human abilities.

What about a computer that is advanced enough to write its own software? And/or more to the point, to design and build another computer? And what if the output of this leads to a succession of computers designing and building the next models? At what point would you say model N (N >> 1) is not just "nothing but a human creation?"

Second, the human brain is so complex it will never be able to be duplicated.

Define "complex." If you mean storage capacity or processing speed, in some ways, computers are already beyond the capacity of the human brain. They can

Quoting bjkeefe: ... to sell a link:

Too strong? probably, but it really is that good.

Quoting JonIrenicus: Too strong?

Yeah. I don't know how unusual I am in this regard, but when someone tells me too adamantly that something is "that good" and that I must partake of it or I'm inferior, I tend to go full metal mule.

Quoting bjkeefe: Assuming that the me in the dungeon wasn't actually being gruesomely tormented, and again, that the copy is exact, I don't think I'd have a problem doing that, either. One benefit for the dungeon me could be, as I suggested before, in a scenario where the original me had been physically and irreparably damaged. I assumed that the original me would be killed after the copy had been created, but if someone said, "Look, you're paralyzed from the neck down and we can't fix that. But we can make an exact copy of you (without the broken spine), and what we ask in return is that we get to keep the original you here to run tests on, so that maybe someday, we can fix this kind of injury," I think I'd be pretty happy to make that deal.

Now, supposing that scenario plays out, I agree that there are two distinct entities which, very quickly, will begin to diverge; i.e., become different. But that is the point I was trying to make back a couple of posts ago: that the me of ten years ago is in some ways different from the me of right now, too, and at the same time, there

Quoting bjkeefe:

Define "complex."

By complex I mean that the human brain takes so much into consideration when making a decision on how to act. It takes things into consideration which are unquantifiable and perhaps never even knowable. It is subtle in ways that would be very difficult or impossible to replicate. I agree that a computer can be built to do anything that has a set of rules about how to do it. But I doubt there is any way to first discover and then replicate all the things a human brain can do. And I do not discount the urge or the people who contemplate such things.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'm sorry, but I just don't follow these at all:
I am distinguishing two senses of "identical". Suppose you see a ping-pong ball today -- perfectly round and white. Tomorrow, I show you two ping-pong balls tomorrow. One of them looks exactly like the one I showed you yesterday -- it's perfectly round and white and exactly the same size. This ping-pong ball is "qualitatively identical" -- i.e., exactly similar to the one I showed you yesterday -- and to millions of other new ping-pong balls.
The other ping-pong ball looks quite similar, but it has a black smudge on it. This ball is not qualitatively identical to the one I showed you yesterday, yet what if I tell you it is the very same ball -- that this ball is identical to the one I showed you yesterday. If you conflate the two senses of identical, you might object, telling me that it couldn't be identical to the one yesterday, because that one was white and round and not smudged at all.

But i point out that a second after I showed you that ball, I smudged it and then locked it away in a safe to which I alone have the combination. It was

Quoting badhatharry: By complex I mean that the human brain takes so much into consideration when making a decision on how to act. It takes things into consideration which are unquantifiable and perhaps never even knowable.

I'm not sure I accept that, in terms of computers in the future. After all, what are decisions made by a human (brain) based on? Some combination of sensory input, memory (experience), and what we might loosely call the hard-wiring that directs things that we aren't consciously aware of. Seems to me (1) the memory part is nearly licked already, although we have a ways to go in terms of actual learning from experience, and (2) the sensors part is not too far behind, either, although computers are still very bad at making sense of what they sense, if you see what I'm saying. As to the "hard-wiring" aspect, it seems to me that if you wanted a computer to make decisions that we might call "not completely rational," for lack of a better term, we could affect its core decision-making process by introducing randomness. Also, although I am very far from up to speed on this aspect of computers, it seems to me

Quoting bjkeefe: As to the "hard-wiring" aspect, it seems to me that if you wanted a computer to make decisions that we might call "not completely rational," for lack of a better term, we could affect its core decision-making process by introducing randomness.

Now, there probably does get to be a point where we'd say that it's going to be very hard to replicate or even imitate what's going on when a human makes a decision based on what we might call intuition. But maybe those aren't the best decisions, and we won't care so much about that.

Put the last bit another way, there's no reason in principle that we have to completely understand a task to the point where we can encode an unambiguous algorithm to address that task. It may well be that we need only build a machine that's advanced enough to understand what the task and desired result it, and then let it get there according to its own path of discovery.

There must be two Bjkeefes. You're the nice one. 'Not completely rational' is not the same as randomness. I'm not sure I understand

Quoting badhatharry: There must be two Bjkeefes. You're the nice one.

No, they are numerically the same.

Quoting spandrel: No, they are numerically the same.

Good!

Quoting badhatharry: There must be two Bjkeefes. You're the nice one.

Thanks!

'Not completely rational' is not the same as randomness.

Agreed. I was simply offering an example of a way one could get a machine decision process to more closely emulate a human decision process. I'm guessing that a typical human decision involves, among other things, the weighting of several considerations, and that these are based largely or entirely on sensory input and past experience, but that the several considerations are differently weighted, perhaps sensitively so, by the environment in which the decision is being made, mood, etc. Assuming we wanted a machine that would make different choices given the same decision at different times, one way we could get this is by introducing a randomizing process when the various weights are assigned. Again, I'm not saying we'd want to, but we could, if that's what we wanted. Actually, I can think of one trivial case right now where we'd probably want this: it'd be a lot more pleasant to listen to synthesized speech (a machine reading to you, your GPS unit giving you directions) if there were some variations in how the words were pronounced.

I'm not sure I understand your

Quoting spandrel: No, they are numerically the same.

Numerologically, at least.

Quoting AemJeff: I'm not sure I'd get completely behind that first graf; but Brendan makes a key point in the second. It's not clear to me that the difference between Brendan-now and Brendan-ten-years-ago and the difference between Brendan-now and Brendan-copy actually differ in kind, BN's valiant efforts to suitably define the potential nature of that distinction notwithstanding. Not only isn't English a sharp enough tool to delineate such distinctions; I'm not sure that the (extremely cogent) questions regarding whether we should regard ourselves as instantiations of "concrete universals" or as "concrete particulars" or even simply as properties are at all answerable.

I vote for the software model (i.e. "concrete universal.") (But for no better reason than that's a reflection of my education and biases.)

Universals are normally regarded as abstract entities, not concrete. I understand that E J Lowe thinks that species can be regarded as concrete universals -- but the computer program still seems to me to be abstract. Can you make a distinction between yourself experiencing a delightful dinner at your favorite restaurant tomorrow, and someone similar to you having that experience? I would look forward in anticipation to the former experience, but I'd

Quoting bjkeefe: Agreed. I was simply offering an example of a way one could get a machine decision process to more closely emulate a human decision process. I'm guessing that a typical human decision involves, among other things, the weighting of several considerations, and that these are based largely or entirely on sensory input and past experience, but that the several considerations are differently weighted, perhaps sensitively so, by the environment in which the decision is being made, mood, etc. Assuming we wanted a machine that would make different choices given the same decision at different times, one way we could get this is by introducing a randomizing process when the various weights are assigned.

Considering that physiological processes have some effect on decision making, I guess they would have to simulate those states or do without them altogether. Randomness wouldn't be a good substitute.

Actually, I can think of one trivial case right now where we'd probably want this: it'd be a lot more pleasant to listen to synthesized speech (a machine reading to you, your GPS unit giving you directions) if there were some variations in how the words were pronounced.

Are you talking about

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Suppose I tell you that (by sheer chance) you have a Doppelganger on Twin Earth -- someone whose memories and personality are qualitatively indistinguishable from yours up to now. I tell you also (and you believe me) that the similarity is going to come to an end tomorrow: one of you will die and the other will live, but I can't tell you which one of you it will be. Would you honestly be completely indifferent between the two possibilities?

I'd want to be the one who lived since we're no longer identical.

Quoting Ocean: Considering that physiological processes have some effect on decision making, I guess they would have to simulate those states or do without them altogether. Randomness wouldn't be a good substitute.

Yes. I was trying to think about a way to include those explicitly, but I ended up getting lazy and just vaguely referring to "mood" and "environment." However, I will restate that I am not sure how much demand there will be for a decision-making machine that is subject to vagaries like those resulting from whatever our (other) physiological processes do to affect the decisions we make.

Are you talking about prosody or you want a GPS with an accent?

Heh. The latter already exists -- my sister has one with a nice British lilt. I was thinking more in terms of not hearing "in.one.hundred.feet.take.a.left." said the exact same way every time.

Intuition refers to having a certain degree of certainty about something that can't be readily explained. Sometimes it contains unconscious emotional components and other times it may be represent a cognitive shortcut. A perfected decision making machine may do better with less of the former and more of the latter.

Agreed. Certainly, for example, picking up on someone's

Quoting bjkeefe:
Heh. The latter already exists -- my sister has one with a nice British lilt. I was thinking more in terms of not hearing "in.one.hundred.feet.take.a.left." said the exact same way every time.

You're talking about prosody then. If you think there is a market for a GPS with a Hispanic accent, let me know, I know a bunch of people looking for jobs.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Universals are normally regarded as abstract entities, not concrete. I understand that E J Lowe thinks that species can be regarded as concrete universals -- but the computer program still seems to me to be abstract.

Can you make a distinction between yourself experiencing a delightful dinner at your favorite restaurant tomorrow, and someone similar to you having that experience? I would look forward in anticipation to the former experience, but I'd be very little interested if it turned out that the person who was going to have that delicious dinner was just someone very like me. Of course, I'm happy in an impersonal way that someone is going to have a lovely dinner, but in that case, I really don't care whether it's someone like me or someone very, very different from me.
If you had an identical twin, would you be looking forward to his dinners, not just in sympathy with him, but really expecting to have the experience yourself?
Of course, an identical twin is not exactly (qualitatively) identical. How similar must someone be before you can reasonably look forward to having his experiences? Or do you not have such a sense of

If you think there is a market for a GPS with a Hispanic accent...

I would pay to have that installed in Mickey's car!!

Although since our ability to test these sorts of things in meatspace is (IMO anyway) way beyond the engineering capabilities of my grandchildren's lifetimes, shouldn't we be focusing on what we can do in virtual worlds? Obviously it isn't the same, but a Turing passer in something like Second Life would be pretty interesting. As for choosing between myself and a doppleganger, obviously I would choose myself. This is the whole point of self. A self that would choose otherwise would have been weeded out by natural selection long ago.

Quoting themightypuck: Although our ability to test these sorts of things in meatspace is (IMO anyway) way beyond the engineering capabilities of my grandchildren's lifetimes, shouldn't we be focusing on what we can do in virtual worlds? Obviously it isn't the same, but a Turing passer in something like Second Life would be pretty interesting.

As for choosing between myself and a doppleganger, obviously I would choose myself. This is the whole point of self. A self that would choose otherwise would have been weeded out by natural selection long ago.

What if both of you think they're the "self?" What if you're both right?

Quoting AemJeff: What if both of you think they're the "self?" What if you're both right?

They would have to think that IMO. I don't believe in zombies. This is why you can't really posit the subjective dilemma in sci fi shows. It's always about a third party choosing between the real self and the fake one. Except in Farscape where the two Crichtons were really two Crichtons.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'm sorry you did not like this diavlog, but I think you should at least appreciate the idea that some people are starting to think through the ramifications of what seems like a plausible technological projection..

Nothing at all is plausible about such projections. The analogy between the human brain and computers is one of the most silly thought clichés of the past 20 years.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'm also not sure why you didn't get that Massimo, at least, was raising objections, or at least expressing skepticism, about the assumption that vastly longer human lifespans would be an inherently good thing..

I got it, and said so.

Quoting bjkeefe: As a minor point, your view that either "technophilia" or "morbid fear of death" are unique to European and American civilization is so ... well, let's just say I refuse to believe you're serious in saying that.

I am quite serious. Technophilia is a western invention: it began in Europe and has become the dominant religion of "progressive" intellectuals. Fear of death may be universal, but the flight from death into a technological fantasy world is a distinctly modern development.

Quoting Florian: Nothing at all is plausible about such projections. The analogy between the human brain and computers is one of the most silly thought clichés of the past 20 years.

Okay. You're entitled to your opinion. I am not 180° opposed to it, but probably about 165°.

I am quite serious. Technophilia is a western invention: it began in Europe and has become the dominant religion of "progressive" intellectuals. Fear of death may be universal, but the flight from death into a technological fantasy world is a distinctly modern development.

Okay, now I see where you're coming from on this; i.e., the two together. I don't agree with it -- the search for the fountain of youth, not to mention cures for infertility and impotence, strike me as global and present throughout recorded history -- but at least it seems less nonsensical.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'd also be leery of thinking exact duplication is the only thing that matters. Think, for example, of the reCAPTCHA project.

Another example along these lines that should have occurred to me: progress in machine translation.

Quoting bjkeefe: Okay. You're entitled to your opinion. I am not 180° opposed to it, but probably about 165°.

Okay, now I see where you're coming from on this; i.e., the two together. I don't agree with it -- the search for the fountain of youth, not to mention cures for infertility and impotence, strike me as global and present throughout recorded history -- but at least it seems less nonsensical.

Most generous of you bj, but you have no authority to say that anyone is or is not entitled to an opinion. Moreover, if you had the slightest acquaintance with philosophy or intellectual history you would be less free in dispensing your opinion on what is or is not nonsensical.

Quoting Florian: Most generous of you bj, but you have no authority to say that anyone is or is not entitled to an opinion.

Sure I do. I'm a member of a community (more than one, actually), and as such, my voice on such matters counts for something, same as anyone else's. Also, it should be pointed out that here, I was not dispensing the privilege, as it were, but merely making an observation.

Moreover, if you had the slightest acquaintance with philosophy or intellectual history you would be less free in dispensing your opinion on what is or is not nonsensical.

It seems to me that if you were not so determined to force everything through the prism of your own favorite field, and to belittle experience in all others, you'd utter less nonsense. Also, assessing the sensibility of a statement is not solely dependent on being able to refer to what a bunch of dead guys said some centuries ago. I'll further remind you that certain of your heroes got in trouble in their own times for insufficient forelock-tugging toward, and compliance with, even earlier supposed figures of authority, so it seems to me that

Quoting uncle ebeneezer: I would pay to have that installed in Mickey's car!!

Yes! with a strong Mexican accent!

Quoting bjkeefe: It seems to me that if you were not so determined to force everything through the prism of your own favorite field, and to belittle experience in all others, you'd utter less nonsense..

And what prism is that? If you want to debate the substance of this diavlog or the aptness of the brain/computer analogy, you just might say something intelligent, but I doubt it. I have noticed that you and some others on this board have as strong a faith in non-existent science as Christians have in a non-existent God.

Quoting bjkeefe: Also, assessing the sensibility of a statement is not solely dependent on being able to refer to what a bunch of dead guys said some centuries ago. I'll further remind you that certain of your heroes got in trouble in their own times for insufficient forelock-tugging toward, and compliance with, even earlier supposed figures of authority, so it seems to me that you might try to bear in mind the possibility that your favorites might not represent the last word on every last topic.

I mentioned no "dead guys." If you knew any philosophy of mind or

Quoting Florian: ...If you knew any philosophy of mind or anything about the philosophy of science, you would not believe in non-existent science. And that is what this diavlog was all about.

Why not? What do you know about the philosophy of science that you believe those of participating in this discussion don't? I daresay you've read more philosophy than some of us, and probably quite a bit less science than many of us. You say seemingly naive things, fairly often, about evolutionary science; and your insistence here that you're better informed than the rest of us on this topic does not seem well supported by what you've actually contributed to the discussion. So, instead of telling us how stupid we are, why don't you detail for us what mistakes you think we're making. Put an argument on the table that contains more than an insult and a hand-wave.

I wonder whether there is some talking past one another here, or if the disagreement is basic. You suggest lots of things have changed in the last 50 years and note that many of them are significant. This is unquestionably true. Especially so at the level of being significant to particular individuals, or in particular circumstances. Specific jobs exist because of technological advances - 50 years ago nobody made a living designing web pages, writing code for computer games, managing networks, or repairing MRI machines. All sorts of medical advances have meant the difference between life and death for lots of folks. Technology continues to change, and continues to change peoples lives. But it is a valid question whether these continued developments have been as fundamentally transformative of life and society as those of the previous 50-100 years. That period saw the emergence of the age of oil and other fossil fuels, changing the world from one in which work was mostly done by the muscles of people and animals. Energy exploitation vastly increased the capacity to create real wealth at so fast a rate that wealth spread to considerably expanded segments

Nice post. It seems very appropriate to remember that we are only starting to see the application of so many new technologies. We don't have a final product yet.

That was a pretty thoughtful essay, cragger. My feeling is that in creating the infrastructure to ensure that most of us, with only modest means, are able to remain in contact with the "grid" 24/7 will prove to be a comparably important change to the effects of the industrial revolution. A lot of the details may currently present as mere gadgets, but the underlying structural changes are an earthquake, I think. The implications as we go forward ought to have us thinking carefully about the nature of these changes. A battery powered GPS enabled communications device that fits in your pocket changes your entire relationship to the world. Going forward: searchable network storage, electronic currency, RFIDS, encryption, secure ID... these are among the things that are contributing to a major new paradigm, I think. The fact that it's easy not to pay attention to the ways in they've changed our lives is not, I think, good evidence that they haven't; and I think those changes are accelerating (and we're not really paying much attention.)

Got around to watching the second-half now.. One thing which neither participants discuss is the possibility of whole-brain emulation, which enables uploading/emulation without needing an abstract theory of general AI. You don't need to understand how intelligence works in order to create intelligence if you can just create a sufficiently-complete simulation of a real brain... and doing so is limited less by our understanding of the brain and more by our lack of computation power. But that's something which we do expect to improve over time.

Quoting AemJeff: [...]

I'll add another vote of approval for cragger's essay, and in some ways, I could be persuaded by it. But Jeff's response also has resonance, and it makes me wonder if what seemed so transformational about the previous half-century compared to the most recent one is that we see the longer-ago one as more compressed. I mean, I don't want to argue the examples too much, but just for concreteness, the emergence of fossil fuels started well before 1900 (with coal, especially), as did transportation (with trains), as did the move of the population to urban centers. And yes, being able to refrigerate food was profound, but so has been the creation of palatable instant meals, not to mention the astonishing growth of reasonably-priced restaurants and take-out places. On this last point, there's probably as much change in the way we Americans, at least, eat as there was prior to 1950. Finally, I think that it is especially hard to realize how profound a change is when one is living in through it. The Internet "seems natural" to many of us, but I suspect that the changes from, say, starting to count from 1995 will be looked back at as equally monumental as

Quoting Peter Twieg: Got around to watching the second-half now..

One thing which neither participants discuss is the possibility of whole-brain emulation, which enables uploading/emulation without needing an abstract theory of general AI. You don't need to understand how intelligence works in order to create intelligence if you can just create a sufficiently-complete simulation of a real brain... and doing so is limited less by our understanding of the brain and more by our lack of computation power. But that's something which we do expect to improve over time.

I agree, generally, and I've tried to suggest this point elsewhere in this thread (e.g.). But thanks for restating it so succinctly.

Now:

Quoting Florian: I have noticed that you and some others on this board have as strong a faith in non-existent science as Christians have in a non-existent God.

Then:

Quoting Florian: You really cannot imagine that anyone can disagree with you and not be a religious fundamentalist. Pitiful.

Quoting bjkeefe: I'll add another vote of approval for cragger's essay, and in some ways, I could be persuaded by it. But Jeff's response also has resonance, and it makes me wonder if what seemed so transformational about the previous half-century compared to the most recent one is that we see the longer-ago one as more compressed.

I mean, I don't want to argue the examples too much, but just for concreteness, the emergence of fossil fuels started well before 1900 (with coal, especially), as did transportation (with trains), as did the move of the population to urban centers. And yes, being able to refrigerate food was profound, but so has been the creation of palatable instant meals, not to mention the astonishing growth of reasonably-priced restaurants and take-out places. On this last point, there's probably as much change in the way we Americans, at least, eat as there was prior to 1950.

Finally, I think that it is especially hard to realize how profound a change is when one is living in through it. The Internet "seems natural" to many of us, but I suspect that the changes from, say, starting to count from 1995 will be looked back at as equally monumental as

Quoting bjkeefe: Now:

Then:

Teasing aside, let me address your assertion that I and others "have as strong a faith in non-existent science as Christians have in a non-existent God," even though I suspect this came more from your temper and wish to strike back then it does from what you actually think. There is, it seems to me, a fundamental difference between believing in an omnipotent, omnipresent, all-powerful Creator of Everything and extrapolating into the near future based on an assessment of what has come before and what we can see right now. Far more often than not, what has been considered impossibly mysterious at one time has become understood, even commonplace, surprisingly shortly afterward, especially when considered on a scale of all of recorded history. This is true for the entire realm of human curiosity where science can be applied, and the rapidity seems especially pronounced when it has involved computer science. It is also true that the very realm itself has repeatedly been expanded -- over and over again, what once seemed like an area out of bounds has been shown to be amenable to scientific explanation, or at least, usefully explored

To the points each of you made, Ocean, Jeff, and Brendan - I think they are generally correct. It is not so much a compressed vision of the past that is relevant, but that it is far easier to see what changes were significant and had which effects in hindsight. It is more difficult to see how ongoing changes will play out, and predict what will result from them in interaction with other changes and influences. Donning the paranoid hat that is frequently within arm's reach one might consider Jeff's example of RFID's. As tools for inventory control they are handy, but hardly something that in and of themseves are likely to change people's lives a great deal. If we consider other potential uses and their impacts it isn't hard to imagine the government requiring implant of an RFID as an identifier beyond the possession of a paper passport in order for a citizen to re-enter the country, and this being extended to driver's licenses (no more fake ID's kids), used for patient identification, and so on. Implanted at birth for all citizens, the embedded ID could become an access

Quoting cragger: [...]

Very well said, and just so you know ...

Quoting cragger: Donning the paranoid hat that is frequently within arm's reach one might consider Jeff's example of RFID's.

... I wear that hat almost every day.

An instance of a computer program on this computer here is an abstract particular. And actually, i should say that many of the Lockean accounts of personal identity (in terms of memory or "psychological continuity") tend to make persons out to be abstract particulars, not universals. I put that aside because the particularity (as Derek Parfit points out, with approval) is secured by a sort of logical trick. I mean the problem with both universals and abstract particulars as accounts of persons is precisely that they are abstract.
I'm still not clear how you are using "concrete" when you speak of a concrete universal. When I speak of a concrete particular, I mean the kind of thing we'd all normally call a "thing" -- you or me or the table -- as opposed to weirder "things" like "whiteness" or "the whiteness of my skin" or something like that. For concrete particulars only certain changes count as ceasing to exist. If I cease to be capable of thought, I cease to exist. If you pour purple paint over me, we could say that my whiteness had ceased to exist and that my purpleness had come into existence, but that would be

The discussion of boredom as an objection to immortality immediately made me think of a very good book I recently read, Julian Barnes's "A History of the World in 10 1/2 Chapters." In the final story (spoilers!) the narrator dies and goes to "the New Heaven," which, unlike the old heaven, is a lot like life on Earth, but you live forever and can get whatever you desire. So the narrator eats the greatest meal of his life every day, can sleep with a different woman every night, and eventually spends his time perfecting his skills in various ways, like practicing golf so much that, over centuries of time, he can hit an 18 on every course. He has a kind of heavenly "case manager" who helps him along the way, and she tells him that everyone without fail eventually asks to "die" again and cease to exist in the new heaven, because it gets repetitive and meaningless. Although the narrator resists this idea, he eventually gives in:

"It seems to me," I went on, "that Heaven's a very good idea, it's a perfect idea you could say, but not for us. Not given the way we are."

Quoting Jyminee: Julian Barnes's "A History of the World in 10 1/2 Chapters."

One of my favorite living writers.* Blows my mind everytime. *Salman Rushdie, John McPhee, and Tom Stoppard are the others.

Quoting Jyminee: "the New Heaven," which, unlike the old heaven, is a lot like life on Earth, but you live forever and can get whatever you desire. So the narrator eats the greatest meal of his life every day, can sleep with a different woman every night, and eventually spends his time perfecting his skills in various ways, like practicing golf so much that, over centuries of time, he can hit an 18 on every course.

Or as David Byrne and Jerry Harrison put it: Everyone is trying to get to the bar
The name of the bar, the bar is called Heaven
The band in Heaven that plays my favorite song
Play it once again, play it all night long
Heaven is a place where nothing, nothing ever happens

Quoting AemJeff: Why not? What do you know about the philosophy of science that you believe those of participating in this discussion don't? I daresay you've read more philosophy than some of us, and probably quite a bit less science than many of us. You say seemingly naive things, fairly often, about evolutionary science; and your insistence here that you're better informed than the rest of us on this topic does not seem well supported by what you've actually contributed to the discussion. So, instead of telling us how stupid we are, why don't you detail for us what mistakes you think we're making. Put an argument on the table that contains more than an insult and a hand-wave.

If you want to reply to my original post, go ahead. I have no interest in engaging you or bjkeefe in a discussion because so far neither of you have said anything directly related to my post. And what exactly has been YOUR contribution to this discussion? There wasn't an ounce of science in this diavlog, but that wasn't my original point. That was directed to the absurdity of believing that prolonging life without

Quoting bjkeefe: There is, it seems to me, a fundamental difference between believing in an omnipotent, omnipresent, all-powerful Creator of Everything and extrapolating into the near future based on an assessment of what has come before and what we can see right now. Far more often than not, what has been considered impossibly mysterious at one time has become understood, even commonplace, surprisingly shortly afterward, especially when considered on a scale of all of recorded history. This is true for the entire realm of human curiosity where science can be applied, and the rapidity seems especially pronounced when it has involved computer science. It is also true that the very realm itself has repeatedly been expanded -- over and over again, what once seemed like an area out of bounds has been shown to be amenable to scientific explanation, or at least, usefully explored using a scientific perspective. So, it is not so much of a leap of faith to think both of these trends will continue; it seems merely like a good bet. Looked at another way, it is an expression of humility to say we are now confident that we don't

Quoting Florian: The so-called quarrel between science and religion is of no interest to me. It was settled long ago.

Hah! I wish.

The fact that it persists in the US is a peculiarity of American culture (or lack thereof).

Hah! You wish.

Yes, science progresses, and sometimes changes the way we think about the world. Pseudo-science also progresses, or proliferates, and changes the way we think about the world, but in the manner of a religion.

Agreed, but it seems to me (most days) that overall, we're making progress on that score. And to the degree that I am pessimistic about it, there is nothing to do but to try to oppose it. If you see AI, brain/computer analogies, etc., as pseudoscience, then you are operating in the same spirit. We just happen not to share the point of view here. I think we're taking the first steps into something that will pan out as worthwhile, if perhaps not how we think it will.

If I may quote what I said in an earlier exchange with you (slightly modified for clarity):

"I introduced this obvious distinction (viz. between language and culture vs. scientific or causal explanation) because naive materialists like you imagine that when they think or speak it is

Quoting Florian: If you want to reply to my original post, go ahead. I have no interest in engaging you or bjkeefe in a discussion because so far neither of you have said anything directly related to my post. And what exactly has been YOUR contribution to this discussion? There wasn't an ounce of science in this diavlog, but that wasn't my original point. That was directed to the absurdity of believing that prolonging life without improving the quality of life is a worthwhile goal.

BTW, neither you nor bj nor spandrel nor claymsher have ever said anything about my "naive" views of evolution (in fact, the history of the theory of evolution) that has impressed me in the least. Indeed, have you ever so much as opened your mouth to show me how I am mistaken in arguing that "natural selection" is a tautology? I think, like so many uninformed people, you think that the conceptual framework of the theory of evolution has never been seriously questioned. Wrong again.

Certainly I have "opened my mouth." I tried specifically to suggest that conflating an iterative selection process with a "tautology" misses the role of feedback in such a system

Quoting AemJeff: Certainly I have "opened my mouth." I tried specifically to suggest that conflating an iterative selection process with a "tautology" misses the role of feedback in such a system and have tried, gently, to persuade you to do some reading on the topics of chaos and complexity.

What I said here is that you're sniping. It's fine to take shots at other people's arguments. But all you've offered in return are airy assertions of your interlocutors supposed failings. I think its perfectly fair to ask you to put something more substantive on the table.

My contribution to this conversation so far has been to ask a few questions (and get schooled on the use of some of the nomenclature by Bloggin' Noggin.) It's a topic on which I have an active interest, and a few opinions; and on which I like to engage. I welcome your participation, as well.

I took no snipes. I expressed an opinion about the ethics of transhumanism. There was not an ounce of science in this whole discussion. Strange that you are so obtuse.

Quoting bjkeefe: No, I don't think I am. I grant the difficulty of trying to study a system when embedded within the system, but we have had some success in attempting to abstract the system, or more precisely, pieces of the system. I think you are mistaken, and dogmatically so, to think we will never be able to make progress in understanding how the brain operates, and I think you are mistaken to dismiss efforts in computer science that may help in this regard. Or -- minor point -- that are natural to talk about by analogy and metaphor to what we (think we) already know..

Your last sentence simply reiterates what I already said. Metaphors, analogies etc. have been used to talk about the mind/brain since antiquity. They are part of our manmade cultural world. I don't think you grasp that a causal explanation of thought or reason would have to be in terms of underlying physical processes, but that the mind can only think in symbols and in the logical categories it has already invented for itself. The computer metaphor gets us no closer to a causal explanation of the what the brain does than Plato's metaphor of

Quoting Florian: The computer metaphor gets us no closer to a causal explanation of the what the brain does than Plato's metaphor of the soul as driven by desire, thumos and logos. Indeed it is even less persuasive because the computer has neither desire nor will (thumos) and its logos is nothing but fancy arithmetic.

So far, but maybe not forever. Which was sort of the point of this diavlog.

Quoting bjkeefe: So far, but maybe not forever.

Which was sort of the point of this diavlog.

I see....No wonder the point escaped me. The point of transhumanism is that once computers become human we can abolish ourselves and let computers carry on being....all too human. So where is the "trans" in transhumanism?

Quoting Florian: I see....No wonder the point escaped me. The point of transhumanism is that once computers become human we can abolish ourselves and let computers carry on being....all too human.

No, but I appreciate your attempt at sarcasm. Kind of like a hot beverage, steeped for thirty seconds. Mmmm, weak tea.

So where is the "trans" in transhumanism?

What's so hard to understand about trans- = beyond? The ideas inherent in transhumanism, as I understand it, are to find ways (1) to overcome the physical limitations of the vessels that carry our brains around, and (2) to augment what our brains are capable of doing. In this diavlog, the limitation most discussed was our comparatively short lifespan and the aging process. But as I understand the term, another probable component of going trans, as it were, will involve the improvement of machine intelligence, using machine intelligence to augment human intelligence, and blurring, ever more so, the line between human and machine intelligence. Now, I'm sure you do not think of computers such as they are today, as anything close to intelligent. I don't, either. But I do sometimes think about things like automated stock trading and the countless other ways computers are, in effect, left to make decisions based on a given, sometimes fuzzy, set

(1) to overcome the physical limitations of the vessels that carry our brains around...

You mean those troublesome bodies that allow us to see, touch, hear, smell, and taste? Sign me up! Wouldn't the only psychologically-workable solution be body-snatching, or growing your own clone? (Sorry if this was discussed in the vlog, I did not watch this one.)

Quoting bjkeefe: No, but I appreciate your attempt at sarcasm. Kind of like a hot beverage, steeped for thirty seconds. Mmmm, weak tea. .

Nothing better than weak tea to cure mental confusion.

Quoting bjkeefe: The ideas inherent in transhumanism, as I understand it, are to find ways (1) to overcome the physical limitations of the vessels that carry our brains around, and (2) to augment what our brains are capable of doing. In this diavlog, the limitation most discussed was our comparatively short lifespan and the aging process. But as I understand the term, another probable component of going trans, as it were, will involve the improvement of machine intelligence, using machine intelligence to augment human intelligence, and blurring, ever more so, the line between human and machine intelligence..

Since the invention of writing, one of the most stupendous rreations of the human intellect after speech itself, mankind has sought to overcome the physical limitations of the brain and augment "what our brains are capable of doing." Machine intelligence, in comparison, is a trivial accomplishment. Books (and their predecessors) were already a vast expansion of individual memory. I agree, though, that the internet has made frequent trips to the library unnecessary. But none of this has any bearing on the claims of

Quoting look: You mean ...

No. Not even close.

Quoting Florian: [...]

Noted. I don't have anything more to say at this time.

What's wrong with transhumanism? Just about everything that could be wrong, is wrong. I just wonder if Massimo wasn't being overly civil, as blheads are wont to be. He's not a "radical critic," he says. But just on the main point, I wonder what his upper limit on human life expectancy is. I'm estimating, based upon what he actually said, that it's about 100-120 years. Beyond this, it's pointless to speculate. Or, my sense would be that Massimo really thinks that it is ethically repugnant to speculate beyond this, although he was too nice to say this, or thinks it is counter-productive to say this. The human mind is not a computational machine, it can't be modeled, natural languages can't be modeled. There will not be any uploading of human consciousness to a computer, not ever. It is unlikely that there will ever be a computer program that can adequately translate "The New York Times" into French. I realize that this statement will be regarded as foolish by the AI types, but so be it. But let's put it this way. There will be a race against time. It is more likely that humanity will cease to exist or redescend into a Dark Age

Via Harry Brighouse/Crooked Timber:

Quoting ledocs: The human mind is not a computational machine, it can't be modeled, natural languages can't be modeled. There will not be any uploading of human consciousness to a computer, not ever. It is unlikely that there will ever be a computer program that can adequately translate "The New York Times" into French. I realize that this statement will be regarded as foolish by the AI types, but so be it. But let's put it this way. There will be a race against time. It is more likely that humanity will cease to exist or redescend into a Dark Age than that it has the technical and economic ability to write a really good computer program for translating English into French. And while I think that it might be possible, theoretically, to write such a program, or to develop computers that will write such a program and be able to execute it, I don't think that it will ever be possible to write a program that can pass a Turing test for the translation of poetry from its original natural language into another natural language..

Computer translation programs provide some help, in my

Quoting Florian: Literary texts, in which idiom, individual style, historical allusions and cultural background are so important, pose problems of such an order of magnitude that I doubt if a program could ever be devised to do what any educated bilingual with a flair for language is capable of doing.

While I haven't been closely following the debate here, it does make me chuckle to think of what a computer program could ever do with translating Absalom, Absalom, Ulysses, Swann's Way, Doctor Faustus Lights the Lights, or any work of poetry from any era.

Quoting listener: While I haven't been closely following the debate here, it does make me chuckle to think of what a computer program could ever do with translating Absalom, Absalom, Ulysses, Swann's Way, Doctor Faustus Lights the Lights, or any work of poetry from any era.

I want once again to repeat (since you say you haven't read the thread closely) that I think this attitude misses a larger point. Maybe we will not soon have a machine into which we can pipe a work of literature, or a spasm of colloquial speech for that matter, and obtain as output a perfect translation, but maybe having that one machine is not so important. As I indicated elsewhere in this thread, it looks like we (and by "we," I mean mostly the Google) have made some non-trivial progress on the front of machine translation. It further seems to me that: 1. Machine translation, though it does still from time to time yield comical results, is pretty darn good. I have a widget on my iGoogle page that does the job at least 95% of the time in deciphering, say, exchanges en español between Wonderment and Ocean. And that's just for short phrases -- if I want the

Quoting bjkeefe: I'm trying to make the points (1) that it is not so important that we come up with some gadget that does things exactly the way a human would do them, and (2) that it is my sense that this is where things are moving, contra the dreams of early AI enthusiasts. And so, rather than getting bogged down in finding things that one can hold up and say, "Haha! Computers will NEVER be able to do this!," I think it is more important to pay attention to how an ever-increasing amount of processing power, and smarts in the deployment of that power, will affect us in the near-term future. It doesn't matter to most people how a problem gets solved as long as it gets solved, at least as far as most practical matters go, and I think it's far more important to contemplate what the side effects of these alternate paths to problem-solving will mean.

In response to point 1: Important for whom? No one disputes that translation programs are capable of making clunky word-for-word versions of relatively simple texts, and that they may continue to improve, although the progress they

Shorter Franco:

Never mind all the rest of that stuff you said. You don't agree with me on the one point I would like to focus on. Therefore you're stupid.

========== [Added] And this?

Quoting Florian: ... although the progress they have made in the past 10 years isn't very impressive.

Would it kill you to read one short article that contradicts the views you cling to? You could not be more wrong on this point. Just to take one example: the difference between Babelfish c. 2000 and Google's translating tools in 2010 is nothing short of astounding. [Added2] Did you ever read Night Thoughts of a Classical Physicist? Assuming you don't just dismiss it out of hand as "pedestrian" or something (probably, come to think of it, not that safe an assumption), you might give it a look. You remind me of that book.

Quoting bjkeefe: I want once again to repeat (since you say you haven't read the thread closely) that I think this attitude misses a larger point. Maybe we will not soon have a machine into which we can pipe a work of literature, or a spasm of colloquial speech for that matter, and obtain as output a perfect translation, but maybe having that one machine is not so important...

Well, maybe I had no business jumping in at this point -- in addition to confessing that I haven't been following this thread, I'll add that I have no knowledge of AI, and that while the topic is theoretically interesting to me and no doubt an important field of human endeavor, my temperament tends to lead me in other directions. I'll just add one anecdote which you may or may not consider to be germane, and then I'll keep my mouth shut on this topic -- Years ago, I remember reading a novel by the Polish author Stanislaw Lem, titled The Futurological Congress (a wonderful book, by the way, that I'd recommend highly). Though I read the book in translation, the translator had so convincingly converted it into the modern

Quoting listener: [...]

No, actually your thoughts are welcome, and do bear on what I'm trying to get clear in my own mind in this thread. I think I heard that machine musical composition story you were talking about. Suffice it to say that I view(ed) it as I do most stories like this -- a mildly amusing stunt that appears to me to be of more use in grabbing media eyeballs than anything else. I agree with your larger point -- what we call human innovation is so poorly understood and/or seems so hard to replicate that it appears as though it will be some time before we have machines that ... well ... innovate. This is something that I view largely as of abstract interest only, though, given what else I see happening all around us, right now: rapidly-improving dumb machines and how humans tend to pick up whatever is at hand and use it for whatever concerns them at the moment.

Quoting bjkeefe: No, actually your thoughts are welcome, and do bear on what I'm trying to get clear in my own mind in this thread.

Oh, good.

Quoting bjkeefe: ...rapidly-improving dumb machines and how humans tend to pick up whatever is at hand and use it for whatever concerns them at the moment.

You mean, like military drones?

Quoting bjkeefe: Via Harry Brighouse/Crooked Timber:

Nice.

BJKEEFE opines.... Sorry bj, but nothing you said was new to me. So that is why I picked up the thread of AI. I believe that if, per impossibile, a computer program could be devised to translate literary texts, the claims of AI proponents might begin to look interesting. As things stand now, they are just boring. Having done some literary translation (from French, Italian, and German into English), having also done technical translations from French into English and vice versa), I think I know a few things about the difficulty of moving from one language to another. A data base such as Google is collecting will certainly be a valuable tool for translators, but in the final analysis a good translation comes down to the Sprachgefühl ("feeling") of a particular, historically situated individual, and that cannot be taught.

Quoting Florian: ... but in the final analysis a good translation comes down to the Sprachgefühl ("feeling") of a particular, historically situated individual, and that cannot be taught.

That's a feeling you have about it, not a provable assertion. Translation is not a simple mechanical task, of course. It certainly will require better, much smarter processes than we currently seem able to create. It's certainly true is that we haven't achieved anything like human-level machine intelligence, or even primate (or mammal) level machine intelligence. But, so far we have seen no theoretical limits to how far up that ladder we may eventually have the capability to climb. It's possible that such a limitation will become apparent at any moment, of course. But there is no a priori support for the above assertion, or any other such categorical denial of the potential capability of a artificially created intelligence.

Quoting listener: Years ago, I remember reading a novel by the Polish author Stanislaw Lem, titled The Futurological Congress (a wonderful book, by the way, that I'd recommend highly). Though I read the book in translation, the translator had so convincingly converted it into the modern American idiom that it felt like a thoroughly American work, and I had a hard time imagining that it had ever been conceived in any other language. I may be wrong, but it's just hard for me to imagine that anything other than a human mind would be able to accomplish that kind of artistic achievement..

Such translations are all too rare! Maybe their rarity tells us something about the impossibility of computer translations of literary texts. Actually, contrary to what you infer from my remarks about AI, I remain very skeptical about the possibility of such programs. But even aside from question of their feasibility, the premise of the Turing Test strikes me as dubious in the first place.

Quoting AemJeff: That's a feeling you have about it, not a provable assertion. Translation is not a simple mechanical task, of course. It certainly will require better, much smarter processes than we currently seem able to create.

It's certainly true is that we haven't achieved anything like human-level machine intelligence, or even primate (or mammal) level machine intelligence. But, so far we have seen no theoretical limits to how far up that ladder we may eventually have the capability to climb. It's possible that such a limitation will become apparent at any moment, of course. But there is no a priori support for the above assertion, or any other such categorical denial of the potential capability of a artificially created intelligence.

Indeed there is no apriori support for my assertion. And there is no support for your assertion either, either empirical or apriori. As usual, your incurably childish faith in non-existent science stands in lieu of argument.

Quoting Florian: Indeed there is no apriori support for my assertion. And there is no support for your assertion either, either empirical or apriori.

As usual, your incurably childish faith in non-existent science stands in lieu of argument.

What assertion did I make, except to express skepticism about attempts to impose such a priori limits on the discussion? You seem to be attributing to me a faith I don't believe I've ever expressed.

Quoting AemJeff: What assertion did I make, except to express skepticism about attempts to impose such a priori limits on the discussion? You seem to be attributing to me a faith I don't believe I've ever expressed.

What discussion? What limits? 1. AI and the Turing Test? 2. Existing translating programs? 1. John Searle won that argument imo. Artificial intelligence will never be the same as human intelligence (=self-consciousness and will). So in that sense there are limits to artificial intelligence, but there are also limits to human intelligence. They are not the same limits, but they do make a difference! For example, I will never be afraid of a computer. 2. Are there limits to what translating programs can accomplish? I don't know, but I suppose that they can always be improved by expanding the data base. I have been using translation programs for some time. They can produce a rough draft, full of errors and unidiomatic locutions, but they always need to be corrected. I suppose that is better than nothing. I have never found a program that could translate as well or as fast as an educated human translator.

Quoting Florian: What discussion? What limits? 1. AI and the Turing Test? 2. Existing translating programs?

1. John Searle won that argument imo. Artificial intelligence will never be the same as human intelligence (=self-consciousness and will). So in that sense there are limits to artificial intelligence, but there are also limits to human intelligence. They are not the same limits, but they do make a difference! For example, I will never be afraid of a computer.

2. Are there limits to what translating programs can accomplish? I don't know, but I suppose that they can always be improved by expanding the data base. I have been using translation programs for some time. They can produce a rough draft, full of errors and unidiomatic locutions, but they always need to be corrected. I suppose that is better than nothing. I have never found a program that could translate as well or as fast as an educated human translator.

I disagree with some of Searle's arguments, as I've said in this thread. I would not assign a truth value to "Will Artificial Intelligence ever be the same as human intelligence (=self-consciousness and will)." I will say that if a phenomenon has arisen from natural causes, I think it's fair to believe that it can, at

Quoting listener: You mean, like military drones?

I wasn't thinking so much of them at that moment, though I suppose they apply. I was thinking more along the lines of, say, massive databases plus the ever-improving ability to crunch through them quickly, as illustrated by the recent Netflix news. Add to these, say, improving machine image recognition capabilities coupled with low-cost, networkable video cameras.

Quoting bjkeefe: the recent Netflix news.

Yikes.

Quoting AemJeff: I disagree with some of Searle's arguments, as I've said in this thread. I would not assign a truth value to "Will Artificial Intelligence ever be the same as human intelligence (=self-consciousness and will)." I will say that if a phenomenon has arisen from natural causes, I think it's fair to believe that it can, at least theoretically, be created artificially. (That's probably the extent of my "faith" here.)

That is already a very strong profession of faith. Omitting your "at least theoretically" (which makes no sense in this connection: self-consciousness and will are precisely the characteristics of life that are not theoretical), I fail to see why you think that a phenomenon that has arisen from natural causes could be created or reproduced "artificially," i.e. by human artifice, or art (= gk. techne=skill, invention). There are several ways of conceiving the relationship between art (techne)and nature---art imitates nature, art perfects nature, art supplements nature, art subdues nature---but no one, as far as I know, has ever said that art could rival nature. Well, there was Dr. Frankenstein....

Quoting Florian: That is already a very strong profession of faith. Omitting your "at least theoretically" (which makes no sense in this connection: self-consciousness and will are precisely the characteristics of life that are not theoretical), I fail to see why you think that a phenomenon that has arisen from natural causes could be created or reproduced "artificially," i.e. by human artifice, or art (= gk. techne=skill, invention).

There are several ways of conceiving the relationship between art (techne)and nature---art imitates nature, art perfects nature, art supplements nature, art subdues nature---but no one, as far as I know, has ever said that art could rival nature.

Well, there was Dr. Frankenstein....

Except for the last line, someone probably wrote the above concerning the notion that machines would someday be able to fly in the air, like birds, or stay underwater, like fish, or for that matter, count, sort, and play chess, like humans. Perhaps Jeff and I, and others, have "faith" about the possibilities of something we build someday simulating, emulating, or actually displaying "intelligence," "consciousness," whatever, but it seems to me you are being just as mystical to insist that such a thing could NEVER happen.

Quoting bjkeefe: Except for the last line, someone probably wrote the above concerning the notion that machines would someday be able to fly in the air, like birds, or stay underwater, like fish, or for that matter, count, sort, and play chess, like humans.

Perhaps Jeff and I, and others, have "faith" about the possibilities of something we build someday simulating, emulating, or actually displaying "intelligence," "consciousness," whatever, but it seems to me you are being just as mystical to insist that such a thing could NEVER happen.

Keep up the good faith BJ, but in the meantime leave reason and philosophy to others.

One has to distinguish between distinctions in principle and more contingent distinctions. For example, human consciousness can either be modeled in terms of binary computer codes, or it cannot. This is a matter of principle. To florian's citation of self-consciousness and free will, as things that cannot be modeled in binary computer code, I would add mood, which is fundamental to Heidegger's account of human ontology, for example. This idea of uploading human consciousness to a computer is beyond far-fetched. It's not comparable to the invention of flying machines and underwater machines. It's not an engineering problem. The discussion of translation programs for natural languages would be more interesting if some of the challenges facing their design were adduced and discussed. This general problem is of a different order (much less difficult) than the one of modeling human consciousness generally. But I suspect that there are problems of principle here that make these translation programs more difficult to write than would be the case if the problem were simply in the domain of quantity, of having enough computing power and big enough databases. The problem of making the computer program

Quoting ledocs: This idea of uploading human consciousness to a computer is beyond far-fetched. It's not comparable to the invention of flying machines and underwater machines. It's not an engineering problem.

Everything's "just an engineering problem" once it's been figured out. But until we had some grasp of the principles of aerodynamics, not to mention lighter, more powerful internal combustion engines, heavier-than-air flight was roundly dismissed by the brightest minds of the day as "physically impossible," "utter fantasy," "nonsense," "hubris," etc. You can keep asserting that there is something qualitatively different about the human brain all you want, that it's not just electrochemical reactions and emergent behaviors stemming from the number and complexity of the neural connections. That doesn't make it so. You don't know that, nor does any other philosopher. You're making a safe bet for the near term, I'd say, but to say it'll never happen seems like nothing more than an argument from personal incredulity.

Quoting bjkeefe: You can keep asserting that there is something qualitatively different about the human brain all you want, that it's not just electrochemical reactions and emergent behaviors stemming from the number and complexity of the neural connections. That doesn't make it so. You don't know that, nor does any other philosopher. You're making a safe bet for the near term, I'd say, but to say it'll never happen seems like nothing more than an argument from personal incredulity.

Yes, we can keep on asserting that there is something different about consciousness and will, BJ, because you keep on asserting nonsense with the fatuous self-confidence of someone who knows as little about science as about philosophy. I suppose one could attribute your remarks in this discussion to electrochemical reactions, but they seem to me to belong rather to the domain of mental pathology.

Quoting Florian: Yes, we can keep on asserting that there is something different about consciousness and will, BJ, because you keep on asserting nonsense with the fatuous self-confidence of someone who knows as little about science as about philosophy.

I suppose one could attribute your remarks in this discussion to electrochemical reactions, but they seem to me to belong rather to the domain of mental pathology.

Be as ill-tempered as you like because I am not genuflecting to your gods, Franco, but if you're hoping to convince me to come over to your way of seeing things, possibly the only technique less effective than your argument from ignorance is your argument from arrogance.

Quoting bjkeefe: Be as ill-tempered as you like because I am not genuflecting to your gods, Franco, but if you're hoping to convince me to come over to your way of seeing things, possibly the only technique less effective than your argument from ignorance is your argument from arrogance.

Actually, I have never used that argument. It is, however, your favorite argument because, as far as I can tell, you are totally ignorant about the subject of this thread. Go back to your political and internet trivia, where you can excel.

I've been following this conversation with interest, and it occurred to me that certain aspects of the discussion (in particular, the escalating glee which each party seems to take in disparaging the other's rationality) are taking on the character of a Woody Allen piece that I'd read years ago.

Quoting Florian: Actually, I have never used that argument.

Really? I think it's safe to say that apart from the endless repetitions of "YORE STUPID!!!1!," the only thing you've had to say in this thread amounts to "I don't believe any of these things could ever happen because I don't see how they could happen, and neither did a bunch of other guys whose books I read, and never mind that they lived at a time when the state of the art of computing machinery was the abacus."

Go back to your political and internet trivia, where you can excel.

Thanks. But don't be bitter just because you're no good at that, either.

Quoting bjkeefe: Everything's "just an engineering problem" once it's been figured out...You can keep asserting that there is something qualitatively different about the human brain all you want, that it's not just electrochemical reactions...

I distinguish between mind (= consciousness) and brain, as I tried to make clear. So this response of yours represents a fundamental misunderstanding. The brain is a physical thing and is in principle reducible to physical phenomena. I have no problem with that. I doubt that it will be possible to simulate even the purely physical brain in a computer program, but that's a different question. The question is whether mind is reducible to brain. I think not. But you've got John Searle on your side here, if that makes you feel better.

Quoting bjkeefe: Really? I think it's safe to say that apart from the endless repetitions of "YORE STUPID!!!1!," the only thing you've had to say in this thread amounts to "I don't believe any of these things could ever happen because I don't see how they could happen, and neither did a bunch of other guys whose books I read, and never mind that they lived at a time when the state of the art of computing machinery was the abacus."

Well, at least I have read a few books. When was the last time you did? The progress of the art of computing has nothing to do with whether or not the mind is like a computer. This is a point I have repeatedly made, and you have repeatedly failed to understand. So yes I guess you are pretty stupid, alas.

Quoting ledocs: The question is whether mind is reducible to brain.

The age-old question, isn't it?

Quoting Florian: Well, at least I have read a few books. When was the last time you did?

Never. Sadly, I am only ever able to read them one at a time. I bow to your multiple personality disorder.

The progress of the art of computing has nothing to do with whether or not the mind is like a computer. This is a point I have repeatedly made, and you have repeatedly failed to understand.

No. That is a point you have repeatedly asserted, which, I'm sorry to have to inform you, is not the same thing as "made." I would add that your inability to retype these assertions without seasoning them with repetitious insults only undermines what little reason one might have to sympathize with your faith.

So yes I guess you are pretty stupid, alas.

Oh good, another one! Whatflorian!

Quoting bjkeefe: No. That is a point you have repeatedly asserted, which, I'm sorry to have to inform you, is not the same thing as "made." I would add that your inability to retype these assertions without seasoning them with repetitious insults only undermines what little reason one might have to sympathize with your faith.

I have asserted nothing but what is self-evident. If you can assert that you are without self-consciousness and will and that all your idiotic utterances in this forum are the result of electrochemical reactions, go ahead. But you will only be proving once again that you are an ignoramus.

Quoting Florian: I have asserted nothing but what is self-evident. If you can assert that you are without self-consciousness and will and that all your idiotic utterances in this forum are the result of electrochemical reactions, go ahead. But you will only be proving once again that you are an ignoramus.

Wouldn't it be easier for you to just type "Haha?"

Except that there are very good a priori reasons for thinking that mind is not reducible to brain, unless one thinks that there can be no a priori, because all thoughts we know about occurred within a body containing a physical brain. Even within the community of philosophers and scientists who worry about these things, I don't think there is anything like a consensus of agreement with Searle that mind = brain. Certainly, I've been reading very violent reactions on the Web to Searle by philosophers who are analytic in their orientation but who don't agree with this identification. And I have started to read these books by Roger Penrose, who does not appear to agree with this identification either. However, it is my hope to read the Penrose books and to review them in my blog, eventually. That's a long slog. In the meantime, you could read the correspondence about mind-body on my blog, if you want to know what my intuitive objections are to the mind = brain equation. I do point out on my blog that Searle himself has nothing approaching an explanation for what we experience as

Quoting bjkeefe: Wouldn't it be easier for you to just type "Haha?"

No doubt. But it is so amusing to keep you going BJ. You are such an absolutely predictable bore.

Quoting ledocs: [...]

Thanks. Maybe someday I'll have a look. I have to say, though, that the questions "Mind=brain?," "Is free will an illusion?," and the like are just not that interesting to me, because I've never seen any indication that there is a way of resolving them, or even making much progress on them. As far as I can, to participate in such discussions, you read a few books, then you go back and forth with other people who have read a few books, both of you appealing to the authorities whose arguments most match what you'd like to believe in the first place. Then you throw in some French phrases, get huffy, stomp around, go quiet, change your name, declare victory, and go back to step one. Not you, per se, but "you" because you can only say "one" so many times. You know what I mean.

Quoting Florian: No doubt. But it is so amusing to keep you going BJ. You are such an absolutely predictable bore.

You are amused by "absolutely predictable bores?" Some life you got there. Then again, maybe it explains why you like reading philosophy.

Quoting bjkeefe: Thanks. Maybe someday I'll have a look.

I have to say, though, that the questions "Mind=brain?," "Is free will an illusion?," and the like are just not that interesting to me, because I've never seen any indication that there is a way of resolving them, or even making much progress on them. As far as I can, to participate in such discussions, you read a few books, then you go back and forth with other people who have read a few books, both of you appealing to the authorities whose arguments most match what you'd like to believe in the first place. Then you throw in some French phrases, get huffy, stomp around, go quiet, change your name, declare victory, and go back to step one.

Not you, per se, but "you" because you can only say "one" so many times. You know what I mean.

It's so much better to end a fruitless discussion by admitting that the respective perspectives are different and irreconcilable or agreeing to disagree, rather than feeling compelled to take a position of superiority by putting down the other side. And the more you put down the adversary, the more you're putting down your own persistence in arguing. Was

Quoting Ocean: Was it the Greek that said that you should always exalt your adversary? If you lose, you are losing only to the greatest power. If you win, it makes your victory even greater.

Never heard that one, but I like it.

Quoting Ocean: It's so much better to end a fruitless discussion by admitting that the respective perspectives are different and irreconcilable or agreeing to disagree, rather than feeling compelled to take a position of superiority by putting down the other side. And the more you put down the adversary, the more you're putting down your own persistence in arguing.

I take your point, but it does carry the assumption that both participants are serious about their disagreements. I don't know about Franco, but that assumption doesn't hold for me -- I'm just playing the dozens here.

Quoting Ocean: Was it the Greek that said that you should always exalt your adversary? If you lose, you are losing only to the greatest power. If you win, it makes your victory even greater.

Sounds like being an Alibi Ike to me. (Was he Greek?) Or at the very least, playing the expectations game, like Sarah Palin's handlers tried to do before the VP debate. So, thanks but no thanks, I guess.

Quoting bjkeefe: I take your point, but it does carry the assumption that both participants are serious about their disagreements. I don't know about Franco, but that assumption doesn't hold for me -- I'm just playing the dozens here.

Well, you're welcome, Brendan. I was somewhat supporting your point in the previous comment...

Sounds like being an Alibi Ike to me. (Was he Greek?) Or at the very least, playing the expectations game, like Sarah Palin's handlers tried to do before the VP debate. So, thanks but no thanks, I guess.

Assuming that it may have been the Ancient Greek that said something of that sort, it is only fair to give them credit. Alibi Ike and Sarah Paling came a few thousand years later, and I don't find them all that inspiring.

Quoting ledocs: Except that there are very good a priori reasons for thinking that mind is not reducible to brain, unless one thinks that there can be no a priori, because all thoughts we know about occurred within a body containing a physical brain.

Even within the community of philosophers and scientists who worry about these things, I don't think there is anything like a consensus of agreement with Searle that mind = brain. Certainly, I've been reading very violent reactions on the Web to Searle by philosophers who are analytic in their orientation but who don't agree with this identification. And I have started to read these books by Roger Penrose, who does not appear to agree with this identification either. However, it is my hope to read the Penrose books and to review them in my blog, eventually. That's a long slog. In the meantime, you could read the correspondence about mind-body on my blog, if you want to know what my intuitive objections are to the mind = brain equation.

I do point out on my blog that Searle himself has nothing approaching an explanation for what we experience as

Not only have I not read Searle's latest, you have just informed me of its existence. I don't see how this book fits in with his mind = brain stuff, unless he has recanted, but it sounds interesting.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: An instance of a computer program on this computer here is an abstract particular. And actually, i should say that many of the Lockean accounts of personal identity (in terms of memory or "psychological continuity") tend to make persons out to be abstract particulars, not universals. I put that aside because the particularity (as Derek Parfit points out, with approval) is secured by a sort of logical trick. I mean the problem with both universals and abstract particulars as accounts of persons is precisely that they are abstract.
I'm still not clear how you are using "concrete" when you speak of a concrete universal. When I speak of a concrete particular, I mean the kind of thing we'd all normally call a "thing" -- you or me or the table -- as opposed to weirder "things" like "whiteness" or "the whiteness of my skin" or something like that. For concrete particulars only certain changes count as ceasing to exist. If I cease to be capable of thought, I cease to exist. If you pour purple paint over me, we could say that my whiteness had ceased to exist and that my purpleness had come into existence, but that would be

Aemjeff asks:

If we imagine the existence of a conscious computer program...

What are you imagining here? What does it mean? The program is just a bunch of logical code. This is like saying, "Suppose we imagine that the text of Descartes's "Meditations" is a conscious human being, that it is Descartes himself..." No one imagines that a physical book is conscious, unless they're on acid or something. So why should we imagine that a bunch of logical statements, strung together, are conscious? But it's not even a question of what we should imagine. I don't understand what you think you are imagining.

Quoting ledocs: Aemjeff asks:

What are you imagining here? What does it mean? The program is just a bunch of logical code. This is like saying, "Suppose we imagine that the text of Descartes's "Meditations" is a conscious human being, that it is Descartes himself..." No one imagines that a physical book is conscious, unless they're on acid or something. So why should we imagine that a bunch of logical statements, strung together, are conscious? But it's not even a question of what we should imagine. I don't understand what you think you are imagining.

Why shouldn't we imagine that? A physical book is not a process, it's a static assortment of symbols. A running computer program is something else entirely. The state of a text is the same from one moment to the next. A running program is dynamic, and capable of altering itself. Can you define any aspect of consciousness that is incompatible with that description? I can certainly rule out the consciousness of a text. I am unaware of any parallel argument about a running program. I'm certain that there's no such proof. Added: these might be a little abstract, but it's probably important to note that a "program" only specifies part of a

Happened across something that reminded me of a minor point raised in this thread:

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: But when it comes to the "teleporter", it doesn't seem to make sense to say that the person who emerges on the other end has undergone some changes in the teleportation process (unless we are subconsciously imagining that an immaterial soul has been transported to the new body).

A few months ago, Sean Carroll blogged about a survey* of philosophers and their attitudes on teleportation. The question, in its entirety, plus the results, as presented by Sean:

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

Accept or lean toward: survival .... 337 / 931 (36.1%)
Other ...................................... 304 / 931 (32.6%)
Accept or lean toward: death ...... 290 / 931 (31.1%)

========== * Turns out this comes from a post by Bryan Caplan, titled "What Do Philosophers Think - and What Do Philosophers Think Philosophers Think?" The results there have more categories than Sean showed -- he added them together in an obvious way. The rest of that post gets away from the issues discussed in this thread, but it's fun, for a look. I'm reminded of the old joke about what you reach if you lay all the economists in the world end to end. Perhaps it needs

Quoting AemJeff: Why shouldn't we imagine that? A physical book is not a process, it's a static assortment of symbols. A running computer program is something else entirely. The state of a text is the same from one moment to the next. A running program is dynamic, and capable of altering itself. Can you define any aspect of consciousness that is incompatible with that description? I can certainly rule out the consciousness of a text. I am unaware of any parallel argument about a running program. I'm certain that there's no such proof.

A book is "a static assortment of symbols" in the same way that a piece of music is "a static assortment of symbols," but that hardly captures the essence of a book or a piece of music. Neither a book nor a piece of music is "actual" (as opposed to static or potential) until the reader or the musician interprets the symbols i.e. reproduces more or less faithfully the thought (intention) of the author or composer which they express. In both cases, a conscious mind, operating with a set of conventional, physical symbols, activates a meaning, an intention, a thought, a mood, a feeling etc. that can only exist in and through another

Quoting Florian: A book is "a static assortment of symbols" in the same way that a piece of music is "a static assortment of symbols," but that hardly captures the essence of a book or a piece of music. Neither a book nor a piece of music is "actual" (as opposed to static or potential) until the reader or the musician interprets the symbols i.e. reproduces more or less faithfully the thought (intention) of the author or composer which they express. In both cases, a conscious mind, operating with a set of conventional, physical symbols, activates a meaning, an intention, a thought, a mood, a feeling etc. that can only exist in and through another conscious mind. Language, like musical notation, are creations of the conscious mind. In the absence of another conscious mind to interpret and understand them they are not even conventional symbols; they are simply traces of black ink on paper They exist in a separate realm, the world of culture and civilization, distinct from both the physical world and the mental world (I am using the terminology of Popper, Eccles, Habermas, Penrose et al. who divide reality into three realms),

In the case of a computer, there is no equivalent

But how do we get from post #206 to a computer that is conscious? Does the fact that the computer can generate its own code show that it is conscious? Is the computer generating code in a way other than according to predefined/programmed instructions, e.g. for recursive functions and quines? Is the computer actually "programming," or just giving predefined output in accordance with a condition that has been met? If a machine can actually perform original programming functions, that would probably constitute a necessary but insufficient condition for the realization of artificial consciousness (AC, see below). I don't know enough about the field to say with specificity what would distinguish "original programming functions" from other code, but essentially, a program that regurgitates code from a database in memory or that reproduces itself, in whole or in part, based upon a condition being met, is not performing original programming. I haven't followed the whole chess computer thing, but I had the impression that the chess computer needs to have at least one human operator when it is playing a grandmaster, that is, it can't operate at a championship level autonomously. According to Wikipedia, Gasparov claimed that Deep

Let me clarify a few things about Haikonen's points. "Classical rule-based computing" isn't the only possible paradigm to represent the general idea of a computing machine. It's just the example that we understand and have exploited best, so far. And a Turing Machine isn't really a computer, in the sense that we usually understand the term (though it is an example of the above paradigm.) The point is that we're not limited to current technology or even currently understood paradigms in discussions of this sort. (Analog computers are an example of a very different, albeit limited, paradigm. Neural networks are another fairly well known example of a different computing model.) In regard to chess programs, I don't know anything about a need for an "operator" to play at the highest level. If that were true, it certainly wouldn't invalidate the concept, since I know for sure that there exist good chess programs that, even if they can't beat Kasparov, play a perfectly competent game. (I've lost my share of games to such programs.) I'm not willing to claim that chess programs are examples of strong AI. They do show that very high degrees of

Report from John Markoff in the NYT begins as follows.

H.P. Sees a Revolution in Memory Chip

PALO ALTO, Calif. — Hewlett-Packard scientists on Thursday are to report advances in the design of a new class of diminutive switches capable of replacing transistors as computer chips shrink closer to the atomic scale.

The devices, known as memristors, or memory resistors, were conceived in 1971 by Leon O. Chua, an electrical engineer at the University of California, Berkeley, but they were not put into effect until 2008 at the H.P. lab here.

They are simpler than today’s semiconducting transistors, can store information even in the absence of an electrical current and, according to a report in Nature, can be used for both data processing and storage applications.

The researchers previously reported in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that they had devised a new method for storing and retrieving information from a vast three-dimensional array of memristors. The scheme could potentially free designers to stack thousands of switches in a high-rise fashion, permitting a new class of ultradense computing devices even after two-dimensional scaling reaches fundamental limits.

Memristor-based systems also hold out the prospect of fashioning

I'd like to add one more thing about becoming immortal (I must say I dont believe in uploading the mental states ): the biggest issue of immortality (or near immortality like states) is our brains. Allthough in a future we can hopefully replace our organs or let machines take over some of our bodily functions, I'm still quite sure that the same processes cannot be applied to a brain (can you imagine our brain being replaced with some machinery?). Almost no new neurons are being produced in our brains during our lifetime, therefore there isnt any system we can exploit to sustain our normal cognitive functioning, most importantly - learning. Neurons have a theoretical and practical lifespan, while I agree that in the future we can shift it more towards the theoretical lifespan, there is no way our biological brains can keep up with our artificial bodys, so the whole point of living 1000 or 10 000 years old becomes irrelevant because we would then also need an artificial brain.